Parks in Germany

Is Germany a country of parks as well? Indeed it is. There is the magnificent Englischer Garten in Munich, the blossoming gardens around the river Alster in Hamburg, the flower beds of the German Federal Garden Show in the capital, Bonn, situated on the Rhine, and over a thousand other parks including whole forests. Again and again the landscape thickens to a park. Where a park transcends the borders of a town and takes over the woody hills both architects and gardeners sail with the wind. A good example is the Gruga Park in Essen, in the Ruhr area: it was laid out in 1929 and comprises waterworks, a botanic garden and exhibition halls. Or the Wilhelmshoehe mountain park at Kassel: in its midst is the residence built in 1786 which was temporarily occupied by Napoleon III. Or Ludwigsburg on the Neckar with baroque palace and park and a fairy-tale garden. The beautiful p... on the Island of Mainau on Lake Constance, on the other hand, is a different kind: here the Swedish Count Bernadotte looks after his gardens with Mediterranean vegetation. Why not make a tour through the parks of Germany?

Ludwigsburg



Gruga-Park/Essen

The German Tribune

...burg, 11 October 1981
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Mexico summit the last chance, Brandt warns

...he North-South summit this month in Mexico must take direct action ...diately, says Willy Brandt, chair... of the Brandt Commission and ...r of the German Social Democrats.

...e made the appeal, in a letter to all ...ties who will attend the conference, because of what he said was the ...ntial worsening of the economic ...tion in many developing countries.

...plaining his comments in Bonn, ...r Brandt regretted serious shortcom...s in international cooperation on ex...ng bodies and in understanding con...tions.

...here was, he said, a shortage of new ...s and of political determination. The ...ico summit was a fine opportunity ...r political dialogue which alone could ...d to a fresh start.

He listed five points that were charac-



teristic of the poor state of current international negotiations:

- The East-West conflict strongly affected the North-South dialogue.
- The deep-seated crisis of the world economy.
- The heavy indebtedness of more and more Third World countries.
- The alarming increase in food shortages in some developing countries, especially in Africa, that could no longer be referred to as developing countries because, as he put it, they were well on the way to underdevelopment.
- International negotiations had ground to a halt and finance problems remained unsolved.

This being the case, the SPD leader said, an immediate programme of action in critical sectors was called for, such as the proposals made by his commission.

Key features of any such programme must include a worldwide food concept, a global energy strategy, additional finance to ensure national economic stability and reforms of international financial institutions.

In his letter to the 22 heads of state and government Herr Brandt urged them to spare no efforts to ensure that global talks, still delayed, could begin early next year.

That, he said, would be a substantial step towards improving the climate of international development cooperation. In this connection the Mexico summit was the last chance.

Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had told a trade union congress the evening beforehand that the oil countries must be told in no uncertain terms that the results would be catastrophic if Third World countries continued to have to pay high oil prices.

Aid to the developing world must not consist of exaggerated technology; it must concentrate mainly on agriculture so as to solve food problems.

(Handelsblatt, 30 September 1981)

A new value for money

WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE

...urrencies in the European Monetary System have been realigned. The de...a was reached by Common Market ...nce Ministers at a meeting in Brus...s.

...e German mark and the Dutch ...er were revalued five-and-a-half per ...t against other EMS currencies. The ...ch franc and the Italian lira were ...lued three per cent against the rest.

...o change course in monetary policy ...early no easy matter, as the tug-of-...r among Finance Ministers over the ...S currency realignment showed.

...onomic interests were at stake. So ...national prestige. What the Ministers ...d in Brussels more or less just ...tioned what the market had already ...ipated — inasmuch as it still works.

...MS exchange rates have drifted fur...r and further apart in the wake of ...cent economic and monetary po...es pursued by EEC countries.

Inflation in France is twice what it is ...Germany. In Italy it is three times as ...h. So a realignment was long overdue.

...t unlike the exchange rate in rela...n to the dollar, which freely and au...atically moves up or down, the ...tschemark's exchange rate with EMS ...rencies is foxed. Changes require a ...tical decision.

The Brussels decisions will probably

Continued on page 2

A state visit to Spain

Bonn President Karl Carstens (right) and his wife, Veronika (second from left) are welcomed on their arrival in Madrid for a state visit to Spain by King Juan Carlos and Queen Sophie. (Photo: dpa)

Genscher slips in quietly to get an Arab opinion

Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stopped over in Qatar en route for Peking. Qatar is an important Opec member and strongly opposed to communist influence in the Arab world.

His host was the emir, Khalifa Bin Hamad al-Thani, whose brother, Foreign Minister Sheikh Suhaim Bin Hamad al-Thani, visited Bonn in 1979.

Qatar is one of half a dozen petroleum-exporting states in the Persian Gulf that are members of a joint council on cooperation in political, military, economic, cultural and social affairs.

Herr Genscher as a keen supporter of regional cooperation has lent this cooperation his express support from the outset. But his bid to link the Gulf states with the European Community by a cooperation agreement in view of tension emanating from Afghanistan and Iran has yet to meet with much support.

Given difficulties in the Arab world the Gulf states evidently are not keen on being too eagerly embraced by third parties.

So Herr Genscher, despite his positive attitude, preferred to maintain a low profile in Qatar.

He was naturally keen to learn in greater detail how his hosts saw the current situation in the Middle East. Little had been heard from the Gulf states on his subject of late.

Neighbouring Saudi Arabia recently proposed a plan that in principle acknowledged, for the first time, Israel's right to exist, although reiterating demands that Israel withdraw from occupied territories.

Bonn noted with interest that French President Francois Mitterrand had stated during his visit to Saudi Arabia that:

"One may discuss individual points but we approve of the spirit of this initiative."

Bonn experts took a no less positive view. Herr Genscher had not yet commented in public.

This restraint was very much in keeping with the entire current outlook of the Bonn government on the Middle East and intended to avoid disturbing the US government's progress towards a viewpoint.

Bonn hopes to learn more soon about President Reagan's attitude on the Middle East. Important pointers should be provided by the visits to Washington by King Hussein of Jordan and Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia.

The German tanks Saudi Arabia would like to order continue to play a significant role in Bonn's calculations.

The Bonn coalition can be expected to conclude its debate on the principles of future arms exports policy soon. A decision will then have to be taken on whether or not to supply Saudi Arabia with Leopard tanks.

It seems reasonable to assume that the US decision on Awacs for Saudi Arabia will have some bearing on the decision Bonn reaches. *Bernt Conrad*

(Die Welt, 30 September 1981)

IN THIS ISSUE

THE BALANCE OF POWER

Either realism in alliance or Russian roulette for the unattainable

The superpowers are talking again, partly because Bonn has put pressure on both sides. To what extent can the Federal Republic of Germany help?

Foreign policy in this day and age can only be pursued within an alliance framework, as even America and Russia have found.

This leads to irrigation and deep frustration both for them and for medium-sized countries that live on borrowed power in areas where the confrontation risk is high.

It prompts calls for radical changes in keeping with the moral claims of one country or the feelings of power of another.

Yet foreign policy aims can only be attained by cooperation and consideration within the relevant alliance.

The only alternative is an all-or-nothing game of Russian roulette for the sake of some utopian hope or other.

The state of an alliance can, of course, influence member-countries' foreign policy in a two-way traffic, so smaller members need not necessarily forgo foreign policy aims of their own.

This is currently truer of the West than it is of Eastern Europe, yet there too the Soviet Union is obliged to bear in mind the interests and stability of Warsaw Pact countries.

A country such as the Federal Republic of Germany cannot afford to dispense with foreign policy aims in accordance with its national interest or with what the German public would like to see.

But these aims must be incorporated in an alliance policy from which it cannot extricate itself without upsetting the apple cart in a poorly predictable manner in an area of some importance in world affairs.

The upset could, moreover, plunge the great powers into an uncontrollable situation of, possibly, direct confrontation.

Bonn must acknowledge this limitation to its national leeway just as it must on no account renounce the attainment of its own aims and objectives.

This is a tall order that holds little prospect of clear success and scant hope of emotional satisfaction.

Prospects for independent foreign policy also appear poorer at a stage of heightening confrontation between the two bloc leaders.

So problems currently seen as part of the North-South conflict can clearly only be solved in the long term within the framework of East-West understanding.

Prospects of this seem poorer, if anything, than a few years ago because the United States sees its role in world affairs even more limitedly than in the past in terms of its own economic and strategic interests.

This is something the Soviet Union has long done in respect of its relations with the Third World.

This US counter-move could conceivably end the process of learning in the Soviet Union by which, some Western politicians had hoped, Moscow might be moved to pursue a more constructive and farsighted policy on Third World problems.

Yet to see these difficulties is not to forget that North-South ties are a growing problem that in the long term is no



less dangerous than the East-West conflict.

But the East-West conflict is something advocates of *realpolitik* in Moscow, Washington and many Western European capitals give greater priority.

Awareness of North-South problems and commitment on them may have increased in the Federal Republic, but Bonn's will and ability to help seem even more limited than in the past.

The economic difficulties of growth rates on the decline are making all Western European countries more inclined than ever to pursue national interests of their own than to opt for foresight and cooperation.

In this context commitments to the Third World are only credible when accompanied by readiness to help and to make sacrifices at home.

By the same token, calls for thrift only sound a credible note when they testify to a more far-reaching political perspective than the desire to balance the budget.

Scant leeway remains in the conflict, what with the unfulfillable demands by the Third World and the tougher approach adopted by major pact partners.

We have seen how it can be put to good use *nonetheless*, given government support, if not official backing.

Via the Socialist International Willy Brandt and Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski sounded a necessary warning and made useful suggestions for a solution to the conflict in El Salvador.

At first glance this may seem to have been a thankless and pointless effort, but moves of this kind can be useful contributions.

They can help one to recognise connections and to see possibilities for solutions that in the long term may provide an insight into Third World problems.

This is more important than laments that all bids to influence Soviet policy on Afghanistan have been ineffective.

The limited opportunities to exert influence are clearly apparent in the more immediate context of foreign policy.

Bids by Bonn to boost political integration in the European Community are hamstrung by the need to restrict financial contributions to the EEC's Brussels budget.

They are also limited by France's independent economic policy, with President Mitterrand proposing a far from clearly outlined European initiative.

Yet M. Mitterrand's socialist economic policies are governed by the French national interest and heading for a confrontation with France's Common Market partners.

There is no sign yet of a Bonn concept to deal with this clash of national interests in the interplay of European objectives.

The weight Bonn's carries depends to no small extent on what the Europeans have in common.

It follows that the influence Bonn is in a position to exert on important aspects of the East-West conflict is weakened by differences of opinion with Britain and France.

Yet Bonn has still managed to accomplish much of importance in this sector. In the late 60s German moves were instrumental in making headway on detente.

The superpowers were predisposed towards detente but there was still resistance to the necessary reappraisal. Progress on new and practical concepts was the only way to overcome it.

In the second half of the 70s Chancellor Schmidt sought in vain to make the Soviet leaders realise how dangerous the vicious circle of their eurostrategic armament was.

He also tried to impress on the United States the need to redress the balance of power.

In the summer of 1980 Herr Schmidt succeeded in Moscow in at least persuading the Soviet union to agree to negotiate. Bonn definitely shares responsibility for talks now having been scheduled.

In ties with the United States it may be effective to say that Bonn is under domestic pressure on one issue or another or that a policy jeopardises West German stability.

But these are points that in dealings with the Soviet Union are likely to have the opposite effect. They will reduce Soviet readiness to limit or reduce its missile potential in Europe or to make concessions on other issues.

So it is not enough for Bonn to urge the superpowers to start talking because the mere fact that US and Soviet envoys have met relieves domestic pressure in Germany.

If Bonn is to exert influence on the course and the success of talks on nuclear armament in Europe and on the East-West conflict it will need to present clearer concepts than hitherto.

They will have to take into consideration not only the ideal eventuality of a zero option but also the inter[...] steps.

Without a definition of these [...] mediate moves East-West talks co[...] easily be limited to an exchange [...] propaganda arguments.

What if the Americans and the [...]sians were to come to the conc[...] that Bonn could not in any case [...] domestic reasons, sustain the Nato [...]sile modernisation decision?

Their interest in negotiating on [...]trolled limitation of Eurostrategic [...]siles would then decline.

So Bonn's endeavours in world [...] can only be effective inasmuch as [...]tains credibility in both domestic [...] foreign policy.

A further important factor is the [...] to supply practical concepts for [...]trategic arms limitation than have [...]herto been proposed.

This must be done regardless wh[...] or not it might give rise to irritati[...] Washington or Moscow.

That talks are to be held at all [...] part, a feather in Bonn's cap, but [...] alone is not enough. Despite dom[...] prejudice German hopes must be [...]pressed more clearly than in a des[...] see the superpowers resume talks.

Bonn must also outline in greater [...]tail the form and practice of contr[...] arms limitation in Europe as it w[...] like to see it.

It must go into greater detail if [...] to bring influence to bear on the [...] West dialogue and to retain dome[...] credibility.

No government can aim at a st[...] affairs in which the lion and the [...] lie peaceful side by side. Political p[...] cannot do so either, whereas p[...] movements may.

It would be more important to c[...] and convincingly state the case b[...] policy of small but practical and [...]tive steps within the limitations [...] national policy imposed by the [...] West conflict and by membership of [...] alliance.

The success of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* [...] decade ago is not easily repeated. Th[...] was a strong feeling that Germ[...] counted for something again in w[...] affairs and was, moreover, on the side [...] peace.

In the current situation this is a f[...]ing that cannot easily be reactivated, [...] to say, and this disappointment leads [...] frustration by the limits to Bonn's [...]eign policy and to a sense of power[...]ness and being out in the cold [...] world of nuclear powers.

German national feeling will hav[...] make to with feeling smaller and [...] hopeful of dramatic breakthroughs.

It will only do so once a policy [...] practical steps opens up the prospect [...] more substantial common-sense [...]tions.

Gerd R[...]

(Vorwärts, 1 October [...])

New value for money

Continued from page 1

restore peace and quiet on money markets.

Their most important consequences are that French and Italian goods and services are less expensive abroad, whereas Dutch and German goods and services are more expensive in the world market.

This could well upset German exports, currently the mainstay of the economy, but exports have proved so resilient in the past that they will probably cope with this new handicap too.

Imports, conversely, are cheaper — a welcome development at a time when inflation has increased to 6.6 per cent.

The Bundesbank will not be able to relax the credit squeeze until the current account is back in balance and inflation has been contained. *Norbert Welter*

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 5 October 1981)

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HOME AFFAIRS

Voters swing towards the conservatives

[...]e SPD leadership is not even [tr]ying to gloss over the Lower Sax[ony e]lection results. They were too tell[ing to] even attempt to minimise the de[feat].

[The] trend no longer favours the SPD; [it ha]s now clearly swung to conserva[tives a]nd environmentalists.

[It i]s useless to say this is usual after [loc]al elections or the voter's attitude [...]ment in local elections because his [vote do]es not decide on world-shattering [nation]al and international issues.

[Thin]gs are no longer as simple as [that.] The Social Democrats are now [engage]d in infighting on a scale remin[iscent] of the Weimar Republic.

[As] the weekend people in Lower Sax[ony w]ent to the poll, the Schleswig-[Holste]in SPD was closing ranks against [the] Nato missile modernisation and [...]ffer decision and thus against the [Chan]cellor's and the government's [...]l policy.

[Th]e Hamburg SPD battled within its [r]anks to arrive at a tenuous truce [inste]ad of standing united in traditional [...]y.

In Berlin, the Young Socialists demonstrated against US Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

And in mid-October SPD executive committee member Erhard Eppler was to use a mass peace demonstration in Bonn to voice his criticism of Chancellor Schmidt's policy.

Meanwhile, SPD chairman Willy Brandt is more concerned with differentiating between party and government than with identifying with government policies.

Thus it takes little imagination to see the deep rift that plagues the Social Democrats. And, as the Lower Saxony elections show, reactions differ.

Those who favour Eppler's line seek an alternative among the environmentalists and similar groupings because they no longer believe their ideas will prevail in view of the Chancellor's stance.

Those who sympathise with the Chancellor, on the other hand, still put their faith in him — but not in his party. This, incidentally, is a phenomenon that, to everybody's surprise, clearly transpired in the national elections last year.

The Social Democrats are faced with a virtually impossible task. If the party opens up to the counter-movement it has no choice but to turn its back on Helmut Schmidt.

Yet, the way things stand, the coalition and hence the SPD as a governing party hinges on Helmut Schmidt personally.

If the party tries to do both, hold on to Schmidt and at the same time open up, it can only do it half-heartedly and without conviction.

So far as the last Bundestag election was concerned, this tension was only resolved temporarily because Franz-Josef Strauss stood for Chancellor.

But there will be no repeat unless the conservatives lose their senses. This, however, is unlikely. In fact, they seem to be headed for a long overdue change.

Willy Brandt's saying that Schmidt will remain Chancellor as long as he wants to begs the question. On what terms will Schmidt be prepared and able to stay at the head of the government?

Not a case of 'writing on the SPD wall'

The Lower Saxony elections must not be interpreted as the writing on the wall for the SPD nationally.

But if the mood it demonstrates does not change by the time of the 1982 state legislature elections, and if the SPD loses the state of Hesse to the CDU, Schmidt would be faced with more than just a personal alarm signal.

The coalition would then become unable to govern due to the Oppositions majority in the Bundesrat.

Hans Schmitz

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 29 September 1981)

Environmental movement keeps gaining

[T]he German party landscape is [b]eginning to change. In the spring [electi]ons in Berlin the environmentalists [v]oted into the legislature and out[poll]ed the FDP.

[Th]e trend has been confirmed in [Lower] Saxony where the environmental[ists ga]rnered 3.6 per cent of the vote. [Th]is figure is a state-wide average [and th]erefore deceptive.

[Th]e fact is that wherever the envi[ronmen]talists stood for office they [polle]d more votes than the FDP.

[Thi]s is reason enough for the estab[lished] parties to start thinking, especially [th]e SPD, which lost many of its [...] voters to the environmentalists.

[...] the environmentalists are far from [...]-entity they were labelled by the [...]SPD head office after last year's [...]l election.

[...] October they were unable to [make] full use of their voter potential [...] polarisation between Schmidt and [...]. In any event, it is the local and [re]gional sectors where the new [mov]ement's strength lies.

[Bu]t this does not mean that the es[tablish]ed parties will not have to reckon [with] the environmentalists at the forth[comin]g state legislature elections and [1]984 general election.

[Th]e environmentalists are more than [just] a passing political phenomenon. [The]y show that a change in the sense of [...] has taken place.

[The]ir emergence signifies that the [...]'s belief in progress is no longer [undis]puted; something felt more keenly [by th]e young than by the older genera[tion].

[The]y are also more than just a play[groun]d for young people who have be[come] bored with affluence. Many young [peop]le are firmly convinced the estab[lished] parties can no longer politically [repres]ent the interests and expecta[tions] of the people.

The political system has ensured unprecedented stability. Since the fourth Bundestag there have been only three parties in a parliament where CDU and SPD represent 90 per cent of the voters.

Up to now, the emergence of new parties, all of which stumbled over the five-per-cent hurdle, has been interpreted at most as a warning.

But for some time now the more farsighted politicians have been asking whether the electorate is really as satisfied with the major parties as elections results seem to indicate. Stability can lead to petrification.

The five-per-cent hurdle that has prevented political fragmentation and protects the big parties from irksome competition has made them smug and stripped them of initiative.

In addition they want to present as streamlined an image as possible to the voter. Dissenters stand no chance.

This is one of the main reasons why the Bonn Bundestag has acquired a reputation for bureaucratic domination and mediocrity.

The parties have monopolised the shaping of the nation's political will rather than reflecting it and have lost contact with the people in the process.

This has created a vacuum in values and aims which is now being filled by the environmentalists.

It is therefore not surprising that the major parties are unable to handle the new movement. They have formed what can best be described as a solidarity cartel of helplessness.

But in the long run they will have to adapt to developments. They are likely to find this difficult because the traditional categories of left and right, conservatism and progressiveness either do not apply to the environmentalists or overlap.

There is probably also a difference between an environmentalist municipal ticket and an environmentalist party that competes in state or national elections.

And since the voter potential of the environmentalists is likely to grow, chances are that they will move into other state legislatures or even the Bundestag, making it as difficult to form a government there as in Berlin.

They have a grassroots understanding of democracy and therefore refuse to join in a coalition. They are only prepared to cooperate with one party or another on specific issues.

As a result, they have brought an element of instability into politics since no government could rely on environmentalist support on all issues.

The SPD, whose left wing shows an inclination to join forces with the environmentalists or to enlist their help in forming a government, as in Kassel, where an SPD mayor was elected with environmentalist backing, must consider these factors even more than the other parties.

True, more parties in parliament would not spell the end of democracy; but additional parties do not mean better solutions for existing problems.

In any event, the three established parties will no longer be able to shirk paying attention to the ideas of the electorate. They should thus become more flexible.

This does not mean that they have to woo the environmentalists but it does mean they will have to compete with them. *Werner Birkenmaier*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 30 September 1981)

Land election 'reflects national mood'

Though municipal, state and national elections can be lumped together to a limited extent only, local elections are nevertheless affected by major politics. The Lower Saxony municipal and district elections are a case in point.

The positive trend for the Opposition in Bonn and the negative one for the Social-Liberal coalition parties were clearly evidenced in Lower Saxony where the CDU gained massively and the SPD lost heavily, while the FDP had a hard time retaining its low level of popularity.

Bonn wrangling over the budget and the disputes over defence policy within the SPD prompted many voters to cast their ballot with the intention of teaching the SPD a lesson.

The outcome of Lower Saxony's local elections mut be seen partly as an indicator of the nation's mood where Bonn is concerned.

The indicator shows a negative trend for the two coalition partners and a positive one for the conservatives. The CDU was the undisputed winner in Lower Saxony.

It profited from the SPD's losses as did the environmenalists, who managed to get into many a local council where they are bound to add a bit of colour to municipal politics and where they will be tipping the scales in many a town when it comes to electing a mayor.

Another noteworthy point is the gains of the Communist Party, which did rather well in some places, as for instance in the university city of Oldenburg.

The success of the environmentalists and *Communists* in Lower Saxony shows that the three-ballot voting system favours the small parties and fringe groups.

Due to the heavy influence of national politics on Lower Saxony's local elections, the results cast a heavy shadow on the state elections in 1982 and, of course, the viabiliy of the Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn.

Next year will see state legislature elections in Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bavaria and Hesse. And if the present

Nordwest Zeitung

negative trend for the SPD continues, Walther Leisler Kiep (CDU) will stand a pretty good chance of taking the helm in Hamburg, while Lower Saxony's Ernst Albrecht is likely to corner the absolute majority in his state.

The Free Democrats in Hesse, who pin their hopes on a coalition with the SPD, will be faced with stiff competition from the environmentalists. Will the SPD-FDP coalition retain a majority?

All this is anything but conducive to the atmosphere in the Bonn coalition, especially as the SPD was made to realise by the Lower Saxony elections that the Chancellor bonus loses its worth when voters realise that Helmut Schmidt and his party don't see eye to eye when it comes to such matters as foreign, security, economic and energy policy.

The elections in Lower Saxony were only local. But these first elections after the budget cutbacks in Bonn show there is a stiff breeze blowing straight into the SPD's face. *Bodo Schulte*

(Nordwest Zeitung, 28 September 1981)

■ INTRA-GERMAN AFFAIRS

How Guillaume ferreted his way to the top

Günter Guillaume, the GDR spy whose arrest in 1974 helped bring down Chancellor Willy Brandt, has been handed over as part of an East-West prisoner exchange.

It was 1969 and the Bonn Chancellery was short of staff when Günter Guillaume, following the advice of Minister Georg Leber (SPD), applied for a job.

The new head of the Chancellery, Horst Ehmke, had, as he himself put it, gone through the Chancellery "with a machine gun" to provide the vacancies that had become necessary when Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger was replaced by Willy Brandt.

In January 1970, when security agencies showed misgivings about Guillaume, Ehmke carried out what he called a "shock opinion survey." The interviews were recorded and the tapes sent to the security agencies.

Guillaume was surprised when he was asked point blank whether he was an East German spy. He made a denial with visible indignation.

This and other embarrassing details relating to Guillaume's career were unearthed at a hearing before a Bundestag fact-finding committee. Günter Guillaume had become a formidable plant at the nerve centre of power in Bonn because of errors in cooperation between government and security agencies.

Material implicating Guillaume that was on record in West Berlin was either misinterpreted or not transferred to Bonn at all.

Allegedly a former publishing house employee in East Berlin, Guillaume arrived in a Giessen refugee camp in May 1956 with his wife Christel and as part of a large trek of other refugees.

He and his wife then went to Frankfurt where his mother-in-law lived.

In Frankfurt, Guillaume, who was then 29, went into business with a typing and copying agency. He later abandoned this and started a little snackbar instead. Eventually he became a photographer.

He and his wife joined the SPD in 1957. Subsequently, she was hired as a secretary at an SPD chapter in Hesse, later becoming a secretary at the State Chancellery in Wiesbaden.

Guillaume vociferously attacked the GDR in discussions at his local SPD chapter, stressing that he was from Berlin (though omitting to add the rider "East"). He soon earned himself the reputation of being helpful and active for the party.

Seven years after joining the SPD, in 1964, he became the manager of the Frankfurt chapter. And a year later he stood for the Hesse legislature, though without a chance of being elected since he was given place number 78 on the ticket.

He later went into municipal politics and became a member of the Frankfurt City Council and, on an honorary basis, manager of the Frankfurt constituency of Georg Leber.

Leber rewarded this by giving Guillaume an outstanding reference.

The reference played a major role in securing his job at the Bonn Chancellery. From 1970 to 1972, Guillaume was just one of many Chancellery staff members, though he held a higher rank than would have been consistent with his training and background. In fact, the staff council had complained about what it called privileged treatment.

In early 1972, Guillaume became one of three personal assistants to Chancellor Willy Brandt, acting as a liaison between party and parliament.

From then on, he was constantly with Brandt, accompanying the Chancellor during his customary strolls and spending time with him in his official residence, on vacation in Norway and at his side during the Lower Saxony election campaign from 7 to 10 April 1974.

His wife had meanwhile become a secretary at the Hesse liaison office in Bonn.

Unlike Günter Guillaume, who presented a generally satisfied image, Frau Guillaume looked drawn and depressed.

This might have been due to the fact that Günter Guillaume did not restrict himself to ferreting out facts and files but went out of his way to cement contacts with the female staff at the Chancellery.

Among his many women friends at the Chancellery was the secretary of Egon Bahr who was at the time working on the East Bloc treaties.

Another was the chief secretary of Günter Gaus, who was preparing to take over the post of Bonn's permanent representative in East Berlin.

Yet another was the secretary of a department head at the Chancellery, today's labour minister in Bonn, Herbert Ehrenberg.

During the hearings before the Bundestag fact-finding committee and at the subsequent trial it transpired that Guillaume had been instructed by East Berlin to report on the personal relations of important politicians such as between Brandt and Herbert Wehner or Brandt and Helmut Schmidt.

Furthermore, he was to report on Brandt's private life and the background of the East Bloc treaties. He completed this mission admirably and also managed to gain access to innumerable telexes, files and even top secret Nato material.

Guillaume usually transmitted his information by radio, though he also used his holidays in France to maintain direct contact with the East Berlin intelligence agency.

At the time of his arrest in his Bonn home on 24 April 1974, he said to the arresting officer: "I am an officer of the GDR's National People's Army. Please treat me accordingly." As an employee of the East Berlin Ministry of State Security, Guillaume held the rank of captain.

Prompted by the fact that a man referred to only as "G" was mentioned three times in various spy trials and because counter intelligence agencies learned of leaks in the Chancellery or in the immediate circle around Willy Brandt, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution decided in the spring of 1973 to regard Guillaume as a suspect.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was interior minister at the time, informed Chancellor Brandt. But the information on the form and degree of his warning is conflicting.

In any event, Brandt was asked to avoid anything that would alert his assistant.

Brandt did not take the warning too seriously and eventually possibly even forgot about it.

Be this as it may, Guillaume was kept under surveillance for months.

Once he deliberately drove his car into a cul-de-sac — a moment of embarrassment for his "tail" but revealing for Guillaume himself.

He knew towards the end that he had been uncovered and this is the reason why he immediately pointed to his GDR army rank when he was arrested.

A Düsseldorf court sentenced him to 13 years imprisonment in December 1975. His wife was sentenced to 8 years.

Frau Guillaume was released from a Cologne prison in March 1981 while Günter Guillaume was still held at the Rheinbach prison near Bonn where he worked in the carpentry shop at first and, later, in the prison laundry.

Guillaume has a kidney and stomach ailment and had to be repeatedly hospitalised. In 1979, he underwent surgery.

The master spy, now 54, was generally considered an exemplary prisoner.

Never before at a prisoners' exchange deal with the GDR was East Berlin prepared to barter so many for one man.

Guillaume had been Willy Brandt's most willing assistant, ready to assume any role — be it that of porter or courtier — or work overtime or generally act as the Chancellor's leg-man.

His son Pierre, who was 17 at the time of Guillaume's arrest in 1974, has been living in East Berlin since then.

Before leaving Bonn, he said about his father: "He was thrifty but not tight fisted. He didn't watch his pennies when going shopping with me. We never had any major political discussions at home and the way I saw it my father was a conservative Social Democrat."

This is exactly how Willy Brandt (he resigned on 6 May 1974, 12 days after Guillaume's arrest, because of this affair among other things) saw Guillaume.

Said he in his resignation address: "I accept the political responsibility for the negligence in connection with the Guillaume spy affair and tender my resignation."

So much for his official statement. Privately, he said at the time: "The whole thing is like a film to me."

It took Willy Brandt a very long time to forgive East Berlin and its spy organisation this personal action against him. He had wrongly believed that there were certain limits even for spies.

Rudolf Strauch

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 29 September 1981)



Happier days: Willy Brandt, as Chancellor, at the SPD conference in Hanover with Günter Guillaume. (Photo: ...)

The question why didn't he run?

Many West German security ... still keep asking themselves ... the GDR spy Günter Guillaume ... for a long prison term instead of ... out of the country before his arrest.

In the course of questioning it ... pired that Guillaume who has ... freed, had been tailed for 11 months ... fore his arrest on 24 April 1974 ... he was aware of it.

According to the investigating ... cers, he wrote down the numbers ... cars used in tailing him.

The parliamentary fact-finding committee and the trial itself dealt ... time with the baffling question ... Guillaume was permitted to stay ... sensitive post in the Chancellery ... the suspicions.

The question remained unanswered.

As early as late May 1973, the ... president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, ... Nollau, informed the then interior minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, about ... suspicion and asked his permission to keep Guillaume under surveillance.

Genscher, in his turn, ... Brandt and asked him to act as if ... ing had happened.

"It was an imposition; and I ... not have gone along with it," ... (who resigned only two weeks ... Guillaume's arrest) later told the ... dorf court that tried Guillaume and sentenced him to 13 years.

As a result of Nollau's request ... let on that anything had happened ... to leave Guillaume in his post ... in the summer of 1973 accompanied ... chancellor to his holiday retreat ... way, where he is said to have ... access to top secret Nato information.

Chancellor Schmidt frequently ... that he would not consider ... Guillaume. His change of ... (Guillaume's wife Christel was ... ed in March) was probably due ... fact that time was of the essence ... advantageous barter deal was ... ise. According to prison spokesman ... laume, who received parole ... and was frequently visited by ... tives of the GDR mission ... severely ill.

Moreover, Guillaume would ... come eligible for parole ... having by then served two-thirds ... term.

Ernst Schieder

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 29 September 1981)

VIEWPOINT

The path to a united society and a secured democracy

Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, who wrote this article for the *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, is a minister of state at the Foreign Office.

The way in which political disputes are often conducted repels many people. What can we do to dispel seeds of doubt about the system?

If you will, 1945 was a third bid to set up a free and democratic system of government in Germany. The first two were in 1848 and 1919.

It was made in virtually hopeless circumstances. The war had been a dead loss, especially the loss of crucial manpower in key generations.

Germany never has been able, for that matter, to offset the losses due to emigration, concentration camps and the war. The older generation had little enthusiasm for democratic ideals; the younger generation had no idea and no experience of them.

Then the breathtaking pace of economic recovery began, in the first half of the 50s, to overlay the painstaking process of political and moral purification.

Anyone who as a young person had consciously experience the post-war years of the post-Hitler era and a time for renewal, atonement and a fresh start could fail to be deeply disappointed by the manner and extent of restoration and change.

There was a growing realisation that fundamental changes had been neglected and that it was high time to carry out political, welfare and social reforms that had been shirked in the 50s.

The 60s were, fittingly, were an age of great and partly utopian hopes. Everything that had been inadequately set in motion since the 50s was to be done at once.

Equality of opportunity and industrial democracy were to be implemented. The education and health systems were to be reformed. Coming of age and emancipation were catchphrases.

People were to participate in democratic processes of decision and self-realisation. Fringe groups and minorities were to be covered.

Environmental conservation, humanisation of the working world and penal reform were envisaged, and miracles were expected overnight on all these fronts.

In retrospect this may seem to have been well-nigh revolutionary. It was bogged down in so-called reality soon enough, yet in two respects has made a profound impact.

The first was the policy of reform embarked on by the Social and Free Democratic Bonn coalition forged in 1969. The second was the exodus from the established political scene of extremist, later terrorist, groups.

By the mid-70s, 30 years after the end of the war and Nazi rule, the development of democracy in Germany could be assessed as follows:

● We had succeeded in establishing a functioning democracy that despite its good and bad points could be termed stable. The overwhelming majority of public opinion was willing to endorse democracy with critical sympathy.

● The public could clearly be seen to have embraced the basic values of a free and democratic system of government. Election turnout was high, election results were stable and left- or right-wing extremists mustered scant support at the polls.

Yet lately there have been increasing indications and trends to be taken more seriously than occasional riots, extremist excesses by small groups or currents hostile towards democracy.

It is no longer individual institutions that are called into question but the system as such: democracy as represented by political parties and in parliamentary bodies.

And this calling into question is proving infectious, extending even to people who have otherwise grown accustomed to democracy combined with steadily increasing affluence.


There is a perceptible malaise that is far too blandly defined as people being fed up with the state, with democracy and, above all, with the political parties.

People of all political hues echo such laments, usually without stopping to give the matter much thought.

Politicians are alleged to speak over the heads and hearts of ordinary people. Politicians in turn feel unfairly slandered and accused.

We are in a state of increasing mutual disappointment and recrimination, and the crunch comes in connection with specific controversies such as environmental protection and energy supplies, nuclear power, housing (the squatters' movement) and now Nato missile modernisation.

Democracy really is going through a trying period that could make or break it. Riots and terrorist raids have assumed



such proportions that they can no longer be dismissed as harmless.

I would number myself among the committed democrats in the ranks of all political parties in the country who are very worried about many features of politics today, especially the way in which disputes are conducted.

I have nothing but disgust for the increasingly crude way in which debate is conducted, the use of violence, the vilification of political opponents and the fanaticisation and emotionalisation of viewpoints.

And I am sceptical about the new guise of a German mission to save the world by virtue of this country being in possession of the sole yardsticks of love of peace, of human rights and the like.

A little more modesty and self-criticism and very much more common sense and moderation in judgment would stand us in good stead.

Two aspects of political life today seem particularly characteristic of its ill of health. The first could be termed alienation, the second is a conflict of generations.

Alienation is, for instance, the growing critical detachment with which people view the politicians they, or over 95 per cent of them, elect and with which they view the governments and the administrative set-up.

Conversely, politicians are patently unable to see, acknowledge and use as a process of what is understood to be extended democracy the growth in political commitment outside the scope of traditional parliamentary parties and party politics.

People have come of age, or at least more so than in the past, which is what politicians have always wished. But they think less in terms of the state and its institutions than of alternatives to them.

Basically, this alienation of the people from their state and its institutions (and their representatives) arises from the contradiction between the growing claims of the individual to democratic freedom in an increasingly organised community and the technocratically and bureaucratically predominated reality of life in a mass society.

This contradiction is a burden on the relationship between people and the state. In the past, people in this country have always tended to believe in authority and the state, yet suddenly they are showing increasing signs of being sick and tired of them.

People complain about the burgeoning civil service, the lack of clarity about the way in which decisions are reached by the state, an administrative system that is poles apart from the general public and the alleged powerlessness of the individual.

The one may not make sense in combination with the other but the phenomenon as a whole deserves to be taken seriously. Walter Scheel is right in saying that:

"In a democracy to be sick and tired of the state is to be sick and tired of oneself, and the one cannot be reduced without the other."

Despite this accurate assessment of the situation what we are currently experiencing is the exact opposite. Mutual alienation of the relatively small number of people in politics and with political responsibility from the general public, inasmuch as it articulates its views politically in any way, is on the increase.

The second aspect of political life today is a specifically German version of the clash between generations.

Mention has already been made of the difficult beginnings of democracy, of the burdens of the past that incipient democracy had to bear and of the widespread post-war desire to suppress and forget the past as fast as possible.

People wanted to forget and set about rebuilding the country instead. This break in continuity applied not only to a recent past about which people preferred not to speak; it led via speechlessness to a much-lamented lack of any kind of historical awareness.

The fear of coming into contact with Germany's not too distant past has deeply disturbed the necessary continuity between one generation and the next, not to mention views on nation and state.

Parents have difficulties in coming to terms with the past. So do children and grandchildren. It is a special kind of clash between the generations, and a most irrational one.

It is not enough to console oneself with the thought that this phase of protest will subside somehow or other, that today's younger generation will grow older and wiser and that the silent majority continues to be satisfied with the present system despite its shortcomings and weaknesses.



Hildegard Hamm-Brücher (Photo: Marianne von der Lancken)

We must go much more thoroughly than we have been doing into the two aspects outlined. We must both discuss them and combat them.

The much-vaunted readiness for dialogue would seem not to be enough. We must accept these phenomena as what they are: symptoms of a deep-seated feeling of uncertainty and insecurity.

They are an expression of malaise, anxiety, the desire for a say and a role in the course of events, and these uneasy feelings are promptly harnessed by spokesmen and string-pullers for whom they are grist to an anti-democratic mill.

Access to and behaviour towards these alarming developments must be aimed in two main directions:

● We must make a concerted effort to defuse and normalise our conflict of generations.

● We must take steps towards overcoming the alienation outlined, and not with a view to some kind of illusory harmony but as a process of necessary change in democracy as we see it and our role in it.

We must pay more careful and considered attention than in the past to the state of political life and take care to ensure, as other democracies do, that it stays in fine fettle.

Steps to defuse and normalise the conflict of genrations could include the following:

● Overcoming speechlessness by more carefully cultivating a sense of history and an exchange between generations by means of as many topical references to the recent past as possible at school and in youth work.

Democracy could, for instance, hold open days with discussions and encounters between generations and between political representatives.

● Making possible, making conscious and strengthening emotional experiences in connection with community and communal experience and the feeling of togetherness; encouraging community commitments and credible behaviour.

● Practising in good time democratic codes of conduct and behaviour, of overcoming and solving conflicts, and underlining the exemplary nature of political events.

● Perceptibly reducing the time spent at school and study and making school and practical experience interchangeable; providing opportunities for individuals to prove their worth.

● Last, let me quote Sigmund Beyer, the burgomaster of Giessen: "Making it clear to young people that the state as a whole is nothing without the input of the individual."

"What matters is to take on this task without reservations, just as generations ...

Continued on page 8

■ EUROPE

EEC seems set for clash as Bonn vows not to bankroll more in Brussels

Bonn's negotiators in Brussels have been unusually conciliatory lately. Wherever you look, be it at the Council of Ministers or the standing committee, the German delegates have clearly shown a willingness to reach a give-and-take arrangement.

Proposals by the Commission which, only a short while ago, met with German objections are now seen as worthy of being considered. And draft resolutions at the Council of Ministers which Bonn blocked not too long ago now meet with approval.

This change of mood is further evidenced by the go-ahead which Finance Ministry State Secretary Horst Schulmann gave to the Ortoli facility in the EEC Council of Finance Ministers.

The decision empowers the EEC Commission to float bonds worth DM2.47bn and use the proceeds for investment in the energy sector and the promotion of small and medium-sized companies.

This plan, put forward by the French vice-president of the EEC Commission, François-Xavier Ortoli, was originally fiercely opposed by the Bonn Finance Ministry.

Unlike in 1978, when the Commission was first empowered by the Council to float bonds worth DM2.5bn and use the proceeds for investment promotion, M. Ortoli this time wanted virtually unlimited powers to issue notes.

Bonn's opposition was not only due to the unsatisfactory experience with the first Ortoli facility but also to general reservations against the EEC bureaucracy assuming the role of banker.

Said State Secretary Schulmann: "After all, we do have such a thing as a European Investment Bank whose capital has only recently been doubled."

That the Bonn Finance Ministry has now decided to waive these perfectly valid reservations and agree to a limited repetition of the Ortoli experiment has political reasons.

Comments a German diplomat in Brussels: "This sweeping willingness to settle secondary issues under dispute is bound to cause trouble eventually."

And indeed, Bonn could well find itself isolated from its Community partners in the next few months when it comes to the crunch in the current debate on the reorientation and financing of the EEC.

How justified this concern is was demonstrated last week when the reform debate in the Council of Foreign Ministers got under way.

There are neither any tangible Community plans for a revamping of agriculture policy nor for Community financing or the transfer of new tasks to the Ten.

Warns a German delegate: "Just about everybody is against us on almost every point."

The reform debate goes back to 1980 when the Council of Ministers made it its task to bring about change.

To prevent a crisis between Britain and the Community, the Council at that time accepted British demands for financial relief and granted London a refund of DM6bn for 1980 and 1981.

A similar deal was to have been made for 1982 if the Community did not manage through political decisions to



shift the weights in the EEC budget in a way that would prevent a repeat of what Britain terms an unacceptable situation.

The main reason for the Community's financial woes is the tide of spending in the agriculture sector. This jointly financed sector devours two-thirds of the Community's budget of DM50bn.

The main beneficiaries are those Community countries whose farmers produce surpluses. The burdens, on the other hand, are increasingly borne by Britain, which has always been an importer of agricultural produce.

Without the financial relief which Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher extorted by threatening to paralyse the EEC, Britain would still be the biggest net payer into EEC coffers, its contribution outstripping even the much more powerful Federal Republic of Germany.

The EEC Commission, which had been asked by the Council of Ministers to work out a lasting solution of this discrepancy, took care of the job by a clever move.

In the report it present to the Council at the end of June, it pointed to certain possibilities of economising in the agriculture sector while at the same time calling for a new drive to promote integration.

The Commission recommended the introduction of a solidarity levy in Britain's favour pending the shift of political weights and a more even distribution of financial burdens.

To finance this, the Commission recommended that the richer members forgo some of the payments due to them from the Agriculture Fund.

But despite this plausible proposal and its being couched as part of an integration drive to prevent anybody from offsetting the advantages of the EEC against its disadvantages, the reform debate in Brussels is in danger of bogging down in details.

Germany and Britain are the only net payers into Community coffers, with Germany being the bigger of the two paymasters.

Having paid DM6bn to Brussels in 1981 (deducting the amounts that came back in the form of benefits), Bonn has a vested interest in giving priority to thrift measures over all other objectives in the reform debate.

Bonn's fixation on this is evidenced by the Finance Ministry's blaming one-quarter of Germany's current account deficit on payments to the Community.

Bonn argues that new Community tasks should not be discussed before we know how much money there will be left once everything has been paid for.

And even then the emphasis must be on areas that cost nothing or next to nothing. This is to ensure that the present EEC budget does not have to be bolstered.

Bonn has already taken precautions in case the Brussels debate remains fruitless and Britain thus becomes entitled to the relief it has been promised.

State Secretary Schulmann has made it clear that his government would then demand that its own payments be reduced.

He said: "The Bonn government is not prepared to remain the only unlimited net payer to the Community."

This earned him and Germany the accusation of engaging in financial hysteria. Old animosities against the Community paymaster and his self-pity came to the fore again.

The dispute is already programmed and so is Bonn's as the tightfisted bogyman while the other Community members now really want to open the floodgates of money, resorting to such popular slogans as "closing ranks to fight unemployment."

The biggest controversy will be that between Bonn and Paris.

Even before President Mitterrand recently announced his plans for European renewal, French Ministers in Brussels hinted that the "social dimension" of the EEC as propagated by them would be costly.

Apart from bolstering the Community's Regional and Social Funds, Pa[ris] also wants to expand the agricultur[al] market. The key phrase here is safegu[ar]ding jobs in rural areas.

Discussions on the financing of [the] Community take third place for Pa[ris] and Foreign Minister Claude Cheys[son] has already said that the present bud[get] cannot be regarded as taboo,

The Italians and the Irish argue a[long] similar lines. They expect to be[nefit] even more from the various Commu[nity] funds, understandably so, consid[ering] their position.

Copenhagen also opposes cuts, but [...] Denmark is one of the main benefi[ciar]ies of the system notwithstanding [...] topping the affluence list.

Like M. Cheysson, Denmark's For[eign] Minister Kjeld Olesen also wants to [give] priority in the discussion to the fu[rther] development of cooperation within [the] Community and the fight against in[fla]tion and unemployment.

He warns that those who wa[nt to] begin reforms by cutting back on spe[nd]ing court a collapse of the Commun[ity].

The dispute over whether to dis[cuss] economy measures first and fu[ture] Community tasks later (the Germ[an] stand) or whether to talk about devel[op]ing the Community first and then ab[out] the financing is unresolved.

The committee of experts which [is] chaired by the British ambassador to [the] EEC, Sir Michael Butler, and which [is] to have discussed details in the next [...] weeks, has arrived at a compromise t[hat] is typical for the Community. [...] aspects of the problem will be revie[wed] simultaneously.

The only quarter from which B[onn] can expect support is London. Thi[s is] due to the identity of interests [of the] only two net payers.

But Bonn representatives in Brus[sels] fear that this identity of interests co[uld] be restricted to financial relief for Bri[t]ain only: "Once the British have [got] what they want, we'll be left out in [the] cold."

The frostiness with which Bonn's a[us]terity demands are likely to met [...] withstanding the avowed loyalty to [the] Community at the recent Cabinet m[eet]ing on European policy is evidenced [by] a remark by Dutch Foreign Mini[ster] Max van der Stoel. He said that he co[uld] visualise financial relief for Britain [but] not for Germany.

Hans-Hagen Brem[er]

(Die Zeit, 25 September 19[81])

Steps towards boosting democracy

Continued from page 5

before us set about the tasks that faced them in their day."

What is more, steps might well be taken to overcome the mutual alienation of parties, politicians and governments on the one hand and democratic forces on the other:

- Political parties must be prepared to take the consequences from criticism fairly levelled at them: for misuse of power, for jobs for the boys, for the rule of officialdom, for self-service ("help yourself") finances and for setting a bad example.

- Parliaments and members of parliament must evolve a new style of debate in both what they say and how they say it. Committee meetings should be held in public whenever possible.

Democratic organisations and, at the regional level, democratically legitimated civic protest movements should be entitled to make submissions and petitions to the appropriate parliamentary body or state assembly.

- Bureaucratic self-importance must be taken down a peg or two. Administrative processes and decisions must be made clearer. More information for the public on planning procedures is likewise rightly demanded.

Regular statutory reports on improvements and simplification of relations between officialdom and the general public could well clear the air.

Particularly striking examples of exemplary behaviour towards the ge[neral] public by civil servants and of [...] improvements suggested by offi[cials] should deserve a word of praise.

- In a free society there is no wa[y in] which a feeling of national soli[darity,] approval of and confidence in the [con]stitutional system set up by the p[eople] themselves can be fostered by eithe[r for]ce or by the use of force.

Yet, they are an essential ground[work] and a vital basic requirement of [a] democratic system. That is why [...] democratic forces in the country w[ould] do well to acknowledge the backg[round] play an active and credible part in [...] ting paid to it.

Hildegard Hamm-Brüc[her]

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und [Welt], 25 September [1981])

EAST BLOC

Energy holds the key to trade with Russia

[DIE WELT]

[Co]operation in the energy sector in [ge]neral and the DM20bn barter deal [...] supply of pipes in return for na[tural] gas were the main topics at the [...] session of the German-Soviet [Econ]omic Affairs Commission.

[It] was attended by Bonn Economic [Affair]s Minister Count Lambsdorff. But [...] in Moscow and at the Commis[sion m]eeting that the deal will be final[ised] notwithstanding American protests.

[Aft]er all, it is not up to the Commis[sion] to make concrete deals. The con[tracts] themselves must be signed by the [comp]anies concerned both here and in [the] Soviet Union.

[Th]e Commission, whose Soviet dele[gatio]n was headed by the deputy chair[man] of the Council of Ministers, Leonid [...]yevich Konstantov, has but one [funct]ion: to discuss trends in current [econ]omic relations.

[Th]e Soviets are about to suggest new [coop]eration projects that are part of their [long-t]erm planning and that require [Germ]an technology for their realisation. [Th]e most spectacular of these projects [is] the coal liquefaction plant in Kant[...]sk, the cost of which is estimated [at] DM5bn.

German companies have already dis[cus]sed the project in Moscow. The next [step] will be the appointment of a per[mane]nt commission of energy experts [which] will work under the Economic Af[fairs] Commission.

[Bo]nn favours closer cooperation in [the] energy sector, notwithstanding [chan]ges in the general political constel[lation].

[Ch]ancellor Schmidt defended the [...]-gas deal at the Ottawa Summit [again]st massive protests by US President [Reag]an who is evidently concerned that [...]t energy imported by Germany will [rise] from the current three per cent of [...] consumption to five per cent.

[Cou]nt Lambsdorff has repeatedly [stre]ssed that Germany, which can meet [...] 40 per cent of its energy require[ment]s from its own resources, must not [only] conserve energy and replace oil by [other] fuels but must also diversify its [sourc]es of imported energy.

[En]ergy imports from the Soviet [Unio]n are seen as part of this diversifi[catio]n programme.

[Bo]nn is unperturbed by the fact that [the] new deal with the Soviet Union will [rais]e the supply of 12bn cubic metres [of g]as starting from 1985 and raise the [...] share from 16 to about 30 per [cent].

[But] this very dependence is what [Amer]ican politicians have zeroed in on.

[Th]e German business community has [been] somewhat surprised at the Ameri[can a]ttitude. America attacks its allies [whil]e it itself has stepped up trade with [the] Soviet Union after the lifting of the [embar]go imposed in connection with [Afgh]anistan.

[Th]us, for instance, America not only [conclu]ded a grain deal in August that [provi]des for a volume of eight million [tons] in 1982; it also signed a deal for [...]00 tons of butter for New Zealand [whic]h is to be processed and go to the [Sovie]t Union in the form of ghee.

And then there is the revival of a $20bn deal involving the barter of American phosphate acid for Soviet ammonia.

Caterpillar has been licensed to supply 100 pipe-laying machines to the Soviet Union.

The contention that this equipment is not intended for the construction of the 5,000 km pipeline from the Yamal Peninsula in Siberia to Western Europe is generally not taken seriously.

In any event, US exports to the Soviet Union in the first quarter of 1981 were 65 per cent higher than a year earlier.

But another crisis (for instance, a Soviet invasion of Poland) would deal a severe blow to German exports to the East Bloc.

The latest natural gas deal, which is expected to be finalised by the time Mr Brezhnev visits Bonn in late November, would naturally fall through if this were to happen.

Count Lambsdorff has repeatedly stressed that this government regards economic relations as an instrument of stability in Europe.


But as the arms race comes into the limelight economic relations must naturally become the target of international criticism.

The recent Ottawa summit spotlighted the differences of views within the Alliance of the role of East-West trade.

American efforts to restrict trade with the East Bloc are now concentrated on the forthcoming special session of the Coordination Committee for East-West Trade (Cocom).

Cocom was established in Paris 30 years ago to coordinate trade in strategically important goods between the Nato countries and Japan on the one side and the East Bloc on the other.

The Cocom list of banned export goods is under constant review in an effort to adapt it to technological developments.



(Cartoon: Mitropoulos/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland)

Cocom requires unanimous decisions because any country that refuses to abide by a decision would naturally have an edge in international competition.

This, in turn, would jeopardise Cocom itself. This is one of the reasons why America finds it hard to make all its partners go along with its policy line.

The Soviets are bound to warn the German delegation in Moscow about adopting a hard line on this issue.

Bonn has made it clear that it endorses America's demands where strategic goods are concerned. But it does not consider all technology exports, such as in the latest gas deal, as strategically important.

Soviet-German trade can be summed up as export of high quality finishing goods against imported raw materials, especially in the energy sector. And this is perfectly in keeping with mutual interests.

After a bonanza in the first half of the 1970s, trade with the East Bloc is now stagnating. While in the period from 1960 to 1970 trade (imports and exports) rose to only DM2.8bn, the period from then until 1975 saw it quadrupling to DM10.2bn a year.

Last year's trade had a volume of DM15.5bn. But what has been rising has been primarily the prices.

As a "fellow traveller" the Soviet Union profited greatly from the Opec price hikes. But Moscow's growing indebteness put a damper on the development of trade. In fact, there were some doubts as to the Soviet Union's creditworthiness at one point.

Since 1975, however, the Soviet Union has made a conspicuous effort to balance its trade.

At that time, Germany showed a surplus of DM3.7bn in its trade with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union exported DM3.2bn worth of goods to this country and imported DM6.9bn worth from Germany.

1979 marked the first surplus year in the Soviet Union's trade with Germany when, due to the oil price explosion, Soviet trade showed a surplus of DM757m.

As the result of an export drive (growth rate 19.9 per cent) German companies last year reversed this negative balance sheet and closed with a surplus of DM426m. The trend continues this year, the first half having seen a surplus of DM150m.

The increase in Germany's export volume by four per cent still means stagnation in terms of quantity because this figure roughly corresponds to the inflation rate.

The increase of Soviet exports to this country by 5.5 per cent is in fact a drop by about 25 per cent due to the price increases for energy.

Natural gas, petroleum and other fuels account for 71 per cent of Germany's imports from the Soviet Union.

But to put the picture into perspective an 80 per cent increase in terms of money means an increase of only 20 per cent in terms of volume. It thus transpires that shipments of crude have dropped by 58 and those of other fuels by 68 per cent.

Experts are unable to say whether the drop is due to shortages in the Soviet Union or to other reasons.

German exports to the Soviet Union are still primarily finished products (78 per cent) but their structure has changed considerably in the past few months.

While shipments of machinery and rolling mills which account for about sixty per cent of German exports, dropped by 35 and 22 per cent respectively in the first half of this year, exports of agricultural goods rose by 127 per cent and now account for 20 per cent of total exports.

Since this year's harvest in the Soviet Union is not likely to be very good, Moscow will probably buy more agricultural products than industrial goods.

But prospects are favourable, if for no other reason due to the added earnings resulting from price increases in the energy sector.

Should cooperation on mammoth projects in this sector come to fruition, the Soviets would have considerably more scope for purchases in the West.

Today, the Soviet Union pays for about 40 per cent of its imports from

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Mannesmann shares first major Siberian gas follow-up order

Mannesmann Anlagenbau AG and Creusot-Loire have won the first major contract in the Soviet-German natural gas deal under the terms of which Soviet Union will supply Germany and several West European countries with 40 billion cubic metres of Siberian gas from 1984/85.

Mannesmann-Creusot are to supply the Soviet Union with 22 compressor stations worth DM2.2bn.

The contract was signed in Düsseldorf by the company's representatives and a Soviet delegation headed by Gas Minister Dinkov, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Sushkov and the president of V/O Makhinoimport, Volchkov.

The entire pipeline from the Yamal peninsula to Western Europe will have 41 compressor stations but the remaining contracts are said to be earmarked for non-German companies.

Under the terms of the contract, AEG-Kanis, Essen, and John Brown, Glasgow, will be acting as subcontractors. AEG-Kanis will supply 47 turbines worth DM700m, which makes it the biggest machinery supplier in the deal.

An AEG spokesman said recently that this will safeguard the jobs at the Kanis works in Essen for at least two years. But AEG will nevertheless try to corner additional contracts for electrical equipment.

The Soviet delegation is said to have stressed its interest in having AEG as a subcontractor.

Salzgitter will not be a party to the deal in which Mannesmann-Creusot are to look after general contracting and engineering; the company put forward its own tender.

In addition to the DM2.2bn, Mannesmann has received a Soviet order for the supply of ancillary equipment worth DM135m. Negotiations on further contracts are to be resumed shortly.

The compressor stations will not be made by Mannesmann themselves.

The deals will initially be financed through a special loan because the parties agreed in July to handle technical equipment separately from the supply of pipes.

The pipe deal is to be concluded in terms of annual quotas and is still under negotiation.

Hans Overberg

(Rheinische Post, 30 September 1981)

RESEARCH

Commercial promise of desalination ship

erman shipbuilders, long berated for lack of imagination, have hit on a ey-spinner, says Helmut Wilckens Thyssen-Nordseewerke, Emden.

is yard has designed and built the a, a desalination factory ship. This idea, he says, shows that German yards are not as sure to miss opporties as the critics would have it.

The first German factory ship is also y of light in an age of gloom and pondency in shipbuilding over most the world.

German yards would certainly long e gone bankrupt had not Bonn ed them out time and again in a eshift manner bridging gaps due to riety of causes.

Orders are few and far between. Yards many countries vie with each other undersell; they are able to do so bee government subsidies keep them

This runs counter to market prin- es, especially with a worldwide sur- s in shipbuilding capacity. German ks are certainly uneconomic.

To make matters worse, German shiped engineers for years have missed portunities. New ideas have simply occurred to them.

While the Japanese have knocked n hulls and sold them as floating tories, rationalising their shipyards as ey did so, Geman shipbuilders have e do with wailing and gnashing of th.

But those days are over now the *Meda* moored at her berth at the Thyssen-seewerke yard in Emden and due st sail soon.

She is a floating desalination plant built h financial backing from the Bonn earch Ministry and know-how suppl- by Incon GmbH of Homburg in the r.

Converting sea water into fresh water fairly simple in principle, but on an strial scale there are many technical ties to overcome before the evapora- process is sufficiently economic to worthwhile.

Energy is the main cost factor. Thys- and Incon have combined several wn processes with a new technique. result is a desalination plant that performs all known competition.

Conventional units need 10 kilograms hot steam to produce 32 kilograms of sh water. The *Meda* needs only one of steam to do so.

What is more, the new factory ship only a third of the energy required conventional installations, and energy an important consideration in Europe, re it is expensive.

Even the Thyssen-Incon process in- des oil at current prices as 20 per cent its overall costs. Yet the unit cost of alinated water is far from out of the stion even in Germany.

A cubic metre of fresh water desali- ed on board the *Meda* in Emden ts DM6 to produce, which works out 0.6 pfennig per litre.

Water boards in Germany sell well or er water at DM1.50 per cubic metre, 0.15 pfennig per litre. This is the ce of water supplied in Bonn, and it fairly representative of the country as a hole.

But it includes the cost of piping the ter to consumers and the cost of administration, which the DM6 in Emden does not.

In areas where oil prices are lower, such as Opec coastal regions, the cost per cubic metre of *Meda* water could be cut to DM5 or even DM3.

This is roughly half the cost of water conventionally desalinated, and the ship can produce 5,000 cubic metres a day, with seven men working a four-shift day round the clock.

This output can be maintained for between 320 and 330 days a year. In terms of Central European water consumption it is enough to supply domestic and industrial consumers in a small town of 25,000 people or so.

But with average consumption in Germany at 200 litres per person per day, *Meda* water would be expensive: DM36 a month per head.

What is more, this DM36 would include neither a profit margin nor the cost of piping water to the consumer. This amount of water currently costs German consumers about DM9 per month.

But the shortage of water is much more important than cost considerations where the *Meda* will shortly be heading. She is bound for the oil-rich shores of the Arab Gulf, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

There she will demonstrate what she can do, and Thyssen-Incon are confident orders will be placed there and then. There has certainly been no shortage of enquiries in Emden.

Desalination factory ships could also be well worthwhile despite the relatively high water price in poorer parts of the Mediterranean too, of course, such as the Greek or Spanish islands.

Ground water is scarce on a number of Greek and Spanish islands that rely heavily on holidaymakers for their living.


Underground tanks are filled during the winter rains but soon run dry in summer when tourists take showers for hours on end; they were not designed for consumption of this kind.

So in many localities no more tourists can be catered for because of the water shortage. But a factory ship could be towed from place to place to top up tanks that were running dangerously low.

So the *Meda* seems sure to be a money-spinner, which should please Bonn Finance Minister Hans Matthöfer.

If the project proves profitable Bonn will be repaid part of the DM22m the Research Ministry has invested in it.

Wolfgang Hoffmann
(Die Zeit, 2 October 1981)



Shining example: mirrors catch the sun in the Almeria solar power project. (Photo: DFVLR)

Solar power experiment shines through setback

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

Experimental solar power stations with a combined capacity of 1,000 kilowatts have been built side by side in a remote but sunsplashed area of southern Spain by two German companies.

Germany, Spain, half a dozen European countries and the United States are associated with the project, which it is hoped will mark the dawn of a new era in power generation.

After a disastrous dress rehearsal, as all actors know, you need no longer worry about the first night. And vice-versa.

The dress rehearsal of the two solar power stations near Almeria went off without a hitch. At the opening ceremony the following day a minor hitch faulted the switch-on until the third attempt.

But this was an insignificant mishap in relation to the two years and DM80m it had taken to build the most up-to-date solar power stations in the world.

It did not upset the German Aerospace Research Institute (DVFLR) team in charge of the project.

The site is a stony plateau near Tabernas, about 30km from Almeria on the Spanish coast. It houses two solar stations based on different principles and built by different German companies.

The MAN installation is based on the solar farm principle. The unit designed and built by Interatom of Bergisch Gladbach, near Cologne, is based on the solar tower principle. Each generates 500 kilowatts.

The solar tower consists of 93 mirrors with a combined surface area of 3,700 square metres that reflect sunlight to the top of a tower 45 metres tall.

The sunlight is magnified to 450 times its strength and heats liquid sodium in a tower-top receiver to more than 500 degrees centigrade.

The hot sodium is channelled to the foot of the tower where it evaporates water to drive a steam generator.

The solar farm consists of 86 semicircular mirrors that beam the sunlight at a focal line along which a special oil circulates.

All done through a heat exchanger

The oil is heated, passes its heat via a heat exchanger to water that is converted into steam to power a turbine and generate power.

One set of mirrors follows the course of the sun vertically. Another follows it both vertically and horizontally, using heliostats.

Between them the two experimental installations generate a megawatt of power that is fed to the local grid, and this output is expected to be maintained throughout the 3,000 hours of sunlight a year.

But for the scientists, technicians and companies concerned the two years of experiments that have now begun are more important.

The twin solar power stations have cost DM80m in all, including infrastructure in a remote region, towards which Bonn has contributed DM30m.

In addition to Germany and Spain, the countries associated with the project are the United States, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Greece.

August Meyer
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 26 September 1981)

Siberian gas deal

Continued from page 7

Germany with its natural gas. If the pipes-gas deal were already in operation, this figure would stand at 80 per cent.

Now, unlike in past years, Bonn makes no bones about the fact that it expects the Soviet Union to buy from German companies if Germany imports its raw materials from there.

Most of this economic cooperation takes place within the framework of long-term contracts or projects. And, unlike in past years, most of these projects are energy-related.

The orders that come in other sectors are usually follow-up orders as in the case of the Kursk steel mill.

Even these replacement and maintenance investments are profitable though the real money lies in the energy sector.

In any event, the future of any of these deals will depend on the political climate.

Hans-J. Mahnke
(Die Welt, 23 September 1981)

■ SCIENCE

Humboldt awards symbolise special German-American relationship

"At the moment we are out of sympathy," said an American woman specialist somewhat grimly at a gathering of German and American scientists in Princeton.

It is unfashionable at present to talk in terms of strokes of good luck in ties between Germans and Americans. Dissatisfaction disturbs the picture, misunderstandings distort it.

Maybe the speaker, a former assistant to Walter Lippmann and now head of the American Council on Germany, had forgotten in the maelstrom of political life that there is more to German-American ties than current events.

The gathering of scientists at which she reached this sad conclusion would certainly have felt the very opposite to be the case.

It was held jointly by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study.

The US scientists invited were Humboldt prizewinners who over the past eight years have come to be familiar with German research departments from within, working in them, many for the first time.

On meeting again in the famed academic atmosphere of Princeton the scientific inspiration between the nations, as mathematician Freeman Dyson put it, was apparent in a way that went well beyond mere demonstrations of sympathy.

Accustomed though they are to dealing with each other in a free and easy manner, both German and American scientists felt their stay in Princeton was a special stroke of good luck.

Good luck, but not just coincidence

It did not come about by sheer coincidence. It originated in an idea more intelligent and testifying to greater sensitivity than is generally attributed to Germans in international affairs.

The story of the Humboldt award scheme began with a gesture of gratitude. It was made by Willy Brandt at a ceremony in Harvard to mark the 25th anniversary of the announcement in 1947 by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall that he planned to set up the European Recovery Programme.

"As an expression of our special gratitude for the decision not to rule us out 25 years ago," Chancellor Brandt said, he had brought America a number of gifts.

The most expensive of these gifts was a fund endowed with DM150m to set up a kind of Marshall aid in reverse in the United States. Its activities are entirely American-run.

He brought DM3m for the Institute of West European Studies in Harvard and also boosted the funds of the Fulbright programme, to which many young German scholarship-holders owed their first post-war experience of the United States.

The Fulbright scholarship scheme is now 80-per-cent financed by Germany.

Herr Brandt's final undertaking was a DM5m annual grant by Bonn towards an exchange programme for senior US scientists. This parting gift was arranged just before he left for America.



It was the work of Bonn Research Minister Hans Leussink, aided and abetted by Finance Minister Alex Möller.

"In Alex Möller, a self-made man," says Professor Leussink now as a governor of the Humboldt Foundation, "the academic community had found someone who, without himself having been to university, felt scientific exchange was not a luxury and not only promised to provide the millions needed for the scheme but also included them in the budget estimates."

Herr Möller also agreed to the scholarships being termed awards, which made them tax-free.

That was what made them attractive for internationally acclaimed specialists of the kind the Germans had in mind as prizewinners and hoped to persuade to spend a year's research in Germany.

A Humboldt award is currently worth about DM100,000 a year. To date 751 awards have been made to American scientists and the American inland revenue service has been persuaded to exempt them from tax too.

The Humboldt Foundation awards opened up the return half of a two-way traffic between the United States and Germany and were a special token of gratitude by the German scientific community.

Many German scientists were enabled by generous US scholarships to spend key initial periods of post-war research in America.

In the biodata of leading German scientists who were members of the German delegation at Princeton, American research institutes, laboratories and observatories play the part of foster-parents that are invariably their first port of call in the United States.

They included Reimar Lüst, head of the Max Planck Society, Eugen Seybold, head of the Scientific Research Association, Manfred Eigen, head of the Max Planck Institute of Biophysical Chemistry, and Nobel laureate Hans Joachim Queisser, head of the Max Planck Institute of Solid-State Physics.

They all feel scientifically at home in the United States. They share with their American colleagues common interests, a common language, English, and also deal with each other in an unpretentious, free and easy manner that is pretty well unheard-of in German academic life.

Their common creed includes a claim to quality so absolute as to allow few compromises, but otherwise they go about their business in keeping with Einstein's dictum: "Make everything as simple as possible, but not more so."

There were three guarantees of the fruitful development of the award scheme: the funds endowed, the foundation spirit and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, which took over its administration.

"Alexander von Humboldt," says Heinrich Pfeiffer, the Foundation's founding father, in a memorable potted version of history, "would never have been a Humboldt prizewinner.

"He was much too poor a student, but luckily for him he had a rich mother. With private instruction he managed to qualify for university entrance.

"He paid for his scientific travel out of his own pocket and when he died he was virtually penniless.

"But German industrialists, the Scientific Academy of St Petersburg and the Royal Society in London decided to endow in his name a foundation that was to finance scientific travel abroad by Germans.

"That was how, in 1860, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for Natural Research and Travel came into being."

It went to the wall in 1923 during the German hyperinflation, but a few years later it was relaunched on a fresh basis by Adolf von Harnack, the first head of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (predecessor of the Max Planck Society), and Albert Einstein.

They were encouraged to re-establish it by Carl Heinrich Becker, the Prussian Education Minister. Its new brief was to award grants to enable foreign research scientists to visit Germany.

German science was at its height. The Foundation's statutes expressly ruled out any idea of quotas for various scientific disciplines. Quality alone was to count. This still is the case.

As a rule 500 grants a year can be made, but if only 420 prospective prizewinners qualify, no attempts are undertaken to make up the numbers.

The number of scientists who apply is much higher than that of specialists in the arts. Since 1953 scholarship-holders, from 64 countries, have numbered 8,000.

The running costs, about DM40m a year, are met largely from the Bonn Foreign Office's cultural affairs budget.

The Humboldt Foundation no longer needs to prove that the knowledge it backs not only serves research but is also capable of active assistance and international understanding.

It proved its own point, having been re-established in 1953 on the initiative of former Humboldt Foundation scholars abroad.

In 1946 a former British Humboldt scholar had ensured that the Allies did not wind up the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and made provision for its survival as the Max Planck Society.

This man happened, by a stroke of good luck, to be scientific adviser to the British military government.

Another Humboldt tale is the story of the university vice-chancellor in Shanghai who was a professor in Darmstadt until 1946 and a former Humboldt scholar.

He too lent invaluable assistance, this time in reforging economic links between Germany and China at the end of the 70s.

Success stories such as these come as no coincidence. The Humboldt Foundation does more than look after its award-winners academically; it also pays them individual, personal attention.

No Humboldt scholar is ever lost sight of; wherever possible he is invited back to Germany a few years later. In individual countries Humboldt clubs have been set up and are regularly toured by Heinrich Pfeiffer and the Foundation's presidents.

Nothing is too much for Pfeiffer, who counts many Humboldt scholars as p[er]sonal friends, while the Foundatio[n] presidents have always lent it the ku[...] of their personal reputations.

The first two presidents were No[bel] laureates Werner Heisenberg and Feod[or] Lynen. The present incumbent is phy[si]cist Wolfgang Paul.

The Princeton venue was a special [ac]colade for the gathering of Humbo[ldt] scholars. The Institute for Advan[ced] Study does not open its doors to anyo[ne]. It picks and chooses its guests.

During the academic year it hou[ses] 170 research fellows from all over [the] world. They live on campus in unass[um]ing bungalows and apartments.

Far away from the madding crowd, [in] unspoilt nature (but with footpa[ths] now so that Europeans can go [for] walks), they go about their scienti[fic] work undisturbed.

The only obligation a fellow has is [to] take tea in the institute every afterno[on]. "For me," a former German fellow [...] "Princeton has the ideal academic [at]mosphere."

Invitations are initiated and inspi[red] by the four schools of the institute, [the] schools of mathematics, natural scienc[e], history and economics, and by the 2[...] permanent fellows.

Permanent fellows are usually to[p-]rank international scientists. The fi[rst] was Einstein. Freeman Dyson, an E[n]glishman, is another.

Ex-flyer's new idea on the quantum theory

Dyson was with the RAF's bomb[er] command during World War II. [He] started studying in America in 1947, [and] was invited to do research at Princeto[n] in 1953.

He had come up with a new idea o[n] quantum theory that intrigued J. Robe[rt] Oppenheimer, who was then head of th[e] institute.

Dyson later grew interested in spa[ce] research and spent a year at the Ma[x] Planck Physics Institute in Munich.

He numbers among the internationa[l] top rank of scientists. In his own disci[]pline he has always had a nose fo[r] promising developments.

Yet during the Princeton gathering h[e] made a brilliant plea for unfashionabl[e] scientists to beaver away at unfashion[]able ideas and against followers of th[e] seasonal fashion who are always to [be] found where the action is.

In the instances he listed of discover[]ies that in their day were of "wonderfu[l] social irrelevance" and took 50 to 10[0] years to be appreciated by fellow-scien[]tists he bore witness to a remarkabl[e] knowledge of outsiders in the history [of] German mathematics.

This was followed by a lively deba[te] between Americans and Germans o[n] how to rescue the mad scientists o[f] the world. How were they to be assu[red] of a niche in the scientific establ[ish]ment?

What chances do outsiders still sta[nd?] People with original ideas, Dyson sa[id], are usually bad at explaining themselv[es]. They depend on the less original pe[ople] who understand them and pave the [way] for them like John the Baptist.

The Institute for Advanced Study [was] set up in 1930 and soon emerged a[s a] beacon of Academe. This was due [in] part to the many German scientists w[ho] followed Einstein into emigration.

In so doing they transferred th[e] centre of scientific progress from th[e] Old World to the New.

At Princeton this time round some[...]

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[TH]E ARTS

[R]ow over DM25m U-boat film

[Da]s Boot (The Boat), based on the [boo]k by Lothar-Günter Buchheim, [co]st DM25m to produce. That [makes] it the most expensive film ever [made in] Germany.

[The] story is based on Buchheim's [own] experiences as a war corre[spondent]. He also wrote the first version [of the] screenplay.

[D]irector Wolfgang Petersen, a war [baby] (he was born in 1941), felt this [vers]ion could not be filmed and [wrote] an entirely new screenplay.

[Buch]heim has since been strongly [critical] of the resulting film.

[Das] Boot tells the tale of a 1941 mis[sion of] a VII C class German U-boat. [The ma]in character is a young lieute[nant pla]yed by Herbert Grönemeyer.

[After] a final party, somewhat despair[ing in] the note of enjoyment it sounds, [Lieutenan]t Werner joins the crew as a [war corre]spondent in La Rochelle.

[He st]ill has illusions about adventure [and hero]ism and feels sure the mission [will bea]r out his view of the world. But, [as in] Buchheim's novel, the opposite [is true].

[The] first successful raids on enemy [shipping] sound a somewhat macabre [note. W]ith bated breath and in deathly [silence] the crew tune in to the creak, [groan an]d gurgle of the ship they have [hit as it] sinks. They feel like a living [de]ad dying.

When the boat itself shakes as bombs explode all round it and fails in a bid to break through the heavily guarded Straits of Gibraltar, initial heroism is brought down to size. The U-boat lies helpless 260 metres under water and could be crushed at any moment by the pressure of the water around it. The crew want no more than just to stay alive.

They are no more than boys. On average, officers apart, U-boat crews were aged 17 to 23. And on their baby faces we suddenly see the beginnings of a realisation that what they are doing is utterly pointless.

It was too, inasmuch as more than three out of four U-boats failed to return to their home ports.

One of the ghastliest scenes is when a British tanker is sunk, its crew jumping in flames into the water. They cry for help as they swim towards the U-boat's turret. The boat's commanding officer, played by Jürgen Prochnow, orders: "Half Speed Astern."

Director Petersen deliberately withholds the information that the order not to pick up shipwrecked enemy crew was given by Grand-Admiral Dönitz himself.

During a sudden night air raid in the Straits of Gibraltar we are not told that the British by this time had radar either.

Petersen banks on the images seen and on the emotions they trigger. Yet he dispenses with undue combat action just as he forgoes deeper psychological insights into his main characters.

This makes them at times seem a little colourless, and this is certainly true of the somewhat oversimplified commanding officer.

Das Boot is not a major Hollywood epic. But the performances by minor characters, especially Otto Sander and Erwin Leder, and the tension it packs make it one of the most remarkable German films for ages. *Berthold Bell*

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 19 September 1981)



Erwin Leder in a scene from the war film *Das Boot*

(Photo: Neue Constantin)

Humboldt

Continued from page 10

one told the tale of David Hilbert, the Göttingen mathematician whose role in mathematics has been compared with that of Alexander the Great in history.

One day Hilbert was on his own in his department in Göttingen. Nearly all his students and staff had been of Jewish extraction and had to emigrate.

At a banquet the old man was jovially asked by a Nazi Party member: "How is mathematics faring in Göttingen now it has finally been freed from Jewish influence?"

"Mathematics in Göttingen?" he said. "It no longer exists." His colleagues and students were in Princeton and New York. Their memory is still treasured in America; those who survive form part of the American scientific establishment.

A number of them have revisited Germany as Humboldt scholars, Gerhard Friedlander, for instance, a physical chemist at Brookhaven, one of the foremost particle accelerators in the United States.

"When Feodor Lynen presented me with the award," he recalls with a smile, "he said: 'You weren't expecting ever to get a prize again from me, were you? '"

Both were born in Munich and had lived in the same street as boys, even playing together. They did not meet again until they were old men.

This is what makes the Humboldt award scheme such magic. It was conceived as a token of gratitude for American aid, but maybe tales such as these will make it a blessing in disguise for us Germans. *Nina Grunenberg*

(Die Zeit, 25 September 1981)

HEALTH

Psychologists take closer look at stuttering

The 11th congress on applied psychology in Heidelberg showed once more that although there are dozens of theories on stuttering, nothing is known for sure.

The practical benefits to be derived from theories are usually negligible. And while scientists fight it out among themselves, stutterers have to cope with their handicap as well as they can.

Experts like Saarbrücken psychologist Rainer Krause hold that the mental stress to which stutterers are subjected is worse than total loss of speech.

He is one of the experts who have departed from the traditional view that stuttering is due to physiological causes. His research and therapeutic experience have led him to believe it is attributable to emotional problems.

The stutterer is like the centipede that "begins to stumble over its legs the moment it starts thinking about them."

To escape social discrimination, the stutterer concentrates so much on controlling his speech that he loses the ability to coordinate it, which in turn results in a total speech collapse.

One of the main reasons is that he tries to control his emotions at all costs because he knows from experience that emotions lead to an accumulation of air in his lungs and thus prevent him from speaking properly.

Yet the reactions of a stutterer in times of danger, fright or stress are much the same as those of other people who continue to speak normally.

They, too, occasionally stutter under stress, but the stutterer has been used from childhood to keeping a firm check on his emotions. His parents trained him to be as sparing as possible in displaying any kind of feeling.

Most therapists later support stutterers in this suppression, recommending them to relax, breathe quietly and compose themselves because, as the experts rightly say, relaxed people speak in a more relaxed fashion.

Psychoanalysts say that stutterers are usually timid and, because they fear fear, are prone to stumble over speech obstacles.

They also avoid situations in which they might be called upon to speak fluently. They even try to reduce their body language to an absolute minimum and to avoid looking people in the eye.

All in all, they try to gloss over their handicap, not only because they are ashamed of it but also to prevent the dreaded stutter in the first place by keeping a tight rein on their emotions and thus their speech. Unfortunately, this is inevitably doomed to failure.

Assuming this theory is right, the use of the various types of apparatus employed by therapists the world over is pointless. Such devices are meant to cure symptoms only, without getting at the root of the problem, while the stutterer needs psychological help.

This applies in equal measure to all technologies used to control the disability. It applies to metric speaking therapy in which a metronome sets the pace, forcing the stutterer to speak slower or faster.

It also applies to the delayed auditive feedback which many therapists praise as *the* remedy. Here, the stutterer hears his own speech via earphones with a split-second time lag that can be regulated.

An equally doubtful aid is the auditive masking technique in which a white rumble transmitted through earphones is superimposed on the stutterer's speech to reduce the number of lapses.

Curiously enough, just wearing earphones without any sound being transmitted has the same effect.

All this proves that such techniques have their limits. They all have one thing in common. They replace the painful self-control of the stutterer by outside control.

Whenever they do show a temporary success the results are because techniques either reduce the speed of speech or draw the stutterer's attention to the technical apparatus or a combination of both.

This also applies to electromyographic biofeedback in which visual signals indicate the degree of muscle tension which the stutterer is supposed to reduce because it is this that allegedly causes the stuttering in the first place.

Here, the stutterer must concentrate on something other than his speech. The result is that there are fewer sounds, syllables and words over which he stumbles.

A Marburg team of researchers headed by Karl Heinz Stäcker has developed yet another device, a phonation feedback apparatus which, via a throat microphone, signals the beginning of a vowel to enable the stutterer to synchronise his speech.

Whatever the practical use of these techniques may be, nobody knows whether they can provide a permanent cure.

No sooner has a stutterer been declared cured by his therapist than he finds himself out in the big, wide world wanting to prove the success of the therapy — and stutters as before.

An experimental dialogue with oneself is entirely different from a dialogue with others. As a result, it is impossible to practise speech without a dialogue partner.

Those therapists who go along with the emotion theory also fear that current therapeutic methods can cost the sufferer dearly in psychological terms. In fact, the price for better speech could well be a psychological disorder.

But practitioners have fewer scruples. What they are after is a success to point to. Instead of pondering the thousands of possible causes of stuttering, they tackle the symptoms, i.e. speech.

Success seems to prove them right — as in the case of a therapy called video confrontation.

Here, the stutterer can watch himself while speaking via a video camera that records every movement, including the typical facial expressions, enabling him to monitor himself.

This means that the therapist can point out the mistakes a stutterer makes and the rate of stuttering declines while the word frequency rises from 40 to 100 a minute.

But the method has so far only been successful with juveniles who, in any event, stand a much better chance of overcoming the problem (70 per cent) than do adults.

Later in life, stutterers usually find themselves with several therapies behind tham and no cure.

For them, the dispute between practitioners and researchers that dominated the Heidelberg congress is a waste of time.

But is it really? The question the therapists in Heidelberg directed at the researchers was: What, if not to restore fluent speech, should be the aim of a therapy?

The researchers' answer was that the stutterer must learn to stutter fluently. As an American researcher once put it: "Stuttering is what you do when you try not to stutter."

The way it looks, the vicious circle of fear and stuttering will only be broken once the stutterer receives adequate psychological help that will make him more self-assured and enable him to give free rein to his emotions.

Frank Niess

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 September 1981)

Chest pain has many causes, worries patients sick

There is almost always a psychosomatic element in chest pains and invariably the patient feels a deep existential fear, a therapy congress in Karlsruhe has been told.

The clinical aspect of this frequent type of pain is many-faceted and has both physiological and psychological elements, Dr Dieter Gross of Frankfurt suggested.

The organs inolved can be the heart, the coronary arteries, the peripheral nerves, the sympaticus nerve, the lungs, the spine, the upper digestive tract as well as the neck and shoulder regions.

Pain can either originate directly in these organs or be projected to the chest from a distant region of the body.

Frequently the patient tells the doctor that the pain only comes with movement. The doctor must pay close attention to the type of pain described by the patient.

Radiating or stabbing pain that occurs when breathing or as a result of touching the chest region usually points to pleurisy.

If the chest pain comes in the form of a spasm in colder weather, at high altitudes or under emotional stress and if it radiates into the arm and the shoulder (mostly on the left) there is a clear indication of an inadequate blood supply to the heart.

Chest pain is never purely physical. It must be seen as a partly psychological health impairment in which the physical or the psychological aspect may prevail, depending on each individual case.

Neurosis or depression is frequently an accompanying element of chest pain or can complicate the condition.

If the doctor finds that there is nothing organically wrong with the patient, he must pay close attention to the vegetative nervous system.

Sweating, a racing heart, insomnia and unresolved conflicts are certain indications of the patient's need for psychosomatic treatment.

But even with chest pain due to organic disorders, psychological elements such as fear or depression play a major role.

Hans Lesser

(Der Tagesspiegel, 24 September 1981)

Adolescent heart risk

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

Today's adolescents run a greater [...] of cardiovascular disorders th[...] rest of the population, a six-year [...] involving 6,000 Cologne juveniles [...]

The provisional conclusions of [...] study, said to be the first of its ki[nd ...] Germany, were released during [...] German congress for paediatric [...]cine in Düsseldorf, which was att[ended] by about 1,000 practising paediatri[cians].

First-year vocational school stu[dents] and girls on the pill appear to be a[...] average risk cases. The number of [smo]kers in these groups is above-av[...] compared with other adolescents.

The two groups, the author of [...] study, Ulrich Laaser of the German [In]stitute for the Combating of Hyper[ten]sion told the congress, must be reg[arded] as high-risk cases in terms of cardi[ovas]cular disorders.

Close to 60 per cent of girls on [...] pill also smoke. And conspicu[...] many vocational school students of [...] sexes are addicted to cigarettes.

This leads to the conclusion th[...] transition to vocational schools [...] hand-in-hand with an increased ris[k ...] becoming a cigarette smoker, be it [...] to added stress or be it due to ne[...] examples by others.

But smoking is only one of the [...] factors in cardiovascular disorders, [...] number one killer in the Federal Rep[ub]lic of Germany.

Recent research, the congress [...] told, indicated that health attitudes [...] patterns were acquired during childho[od] and not only during adolescence.

But relevant research is still in its [in]fancy, which lends added weight to [...] Cologne study, subsidised by the Bo[nn] Health Ministry.

In addition to recording smok[ing] habits, the scientists also recorded bl[ood] pressure, pulse, cholesterol levels, [...] and the weight-height ratio (a [...] proportion of the juveniles were o[ver]weight).

It turned out that 87 per cent of [...] adolescents remained in the top [...] group even five years after their in[itial] check.

In other words, people who are at [...] in their youth remain so for many [...] to come.

Doctors therefore recommend prop[hy]lactic measures at an early age. Unfo[rtu]nately, there are few surveys on di[et] and exercise patterns among G[...] children.

Still, the team that prepared th[e Co]logne study found that German chi[ldren] have an excessive salt intake (10 gra[ms] per person per day). In fact, even inf[ants] are given excessively salty food and [...] develop a liking for salt.

Herr Laaser told the congress [...] recommendations to the industry to [re]duce the salt contents of babyfoods [...] now being prepared.

But he also said that prophyl[actic] measures against cardiovascular [...] in adolescents were unlikely to [...]duced during the 1980s.

Gisela Am[...]

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 23 Septembe[r 1981])

[IM]MIGRANT WORKERS

Suicide often seems the only solution

[...]het, an 18-year-old Turkish boy [...]om Cologne, is one of 350,000 [...]en of Turkish workers in Germany [...]re caught in the nationality trap.

[The]re are times when he feels almost [...]ain in Germany, while in Turkey [he do]es not entirely feel he belongs to [his fa]mily's home country.

[In] a bid to solve his identity problem [he d]raws a clear and deliberate distinc[tion] between his two lives, the German [and] the Turkish:

"[A]t home I never say anything about [what] I experience at school or in my [spare] time; I do what my parents tell [me t]o do.

[With] friends or at school I hardly ever [say a]nything about my parents; instead I [do] what my friends do."

[He] is not a showpiece foreigner, the [...] of Uncle Tom featured on TV [when] minority problems are discussed.

[...]t many people will feel or imagine [xen]ophobia cannot possibly exist, as Mi[...] Visicchio, an Italian, does. He says [it i]s just a matter of some foreigners [mis]behaving and prompting dislike on [the] German's part.

[Vi]sicchio has come to terms with the [Germ]ans ("I have few troubles, if any, [with] them"), but this is possibly hardly [surpri]sing. He is a teacher and has lived [in G]ermany for 15 years.

[Livi]ng in two cultures is a tall order. [An It]alian intellectual may pull it off. A [...] Turkish agricultural engineer [...] so too. But many of their fel[low] countrymen fail to do so.

[Soc]iologist Stephanie von Franken[berg], 28, has made a novel attempt to [...]e the problems *Gastarbeiter*, or [guest] workers, as the migrants are [know]n in German, encounter as they try [to in]tegrate.

[Her] subject at Bochum University is [...]egration among foreign workers in [the] Federal Republic of Germany as re[flecte]d in suicide bids.

[Sh]e is convinced that by no means [ever]y suicide bis is a failed suicide; [the]y are appeals for help to one's sur[roun]dings.

[Sh]e interviewed would-be suicides in [hosp]ital and found they saw no prospect [of res]olving their conflict in socially ac[cepta]ble ways.

[Th]e suicide bid was, on the one hand, [the] much-vaunted cry for help of the [indi]vidual. On the other it was a way of [escap]ing from worries and responsibili[ties] for themselves and others for a [...]

[Su]icide is unconsciously arranged in [such] a way as to ensure that the attempt [...]stand a fair chance of being disco[vere]d in time to rescue them.

[Th]e method selected is usually a soft [...], the heavy but not lethal dose of [sleep]ing pills, not the more foolproof [met]hod of a revolver or a noose.

[Th]e survey deals mainly with the [Ruh]r industrial region, where guest [work]ers make up six per cent of the po[pul]ation.

[I]n Duisburg, a typical Ruhr city that [wou]ld dearly like to rid itself of the re[puta]tion of being a grey industrial town, [...]00 Turks live mainly among them[selv]es.

[The]y live in housing that was built, in [...] near the factories where tenants [...] to work. These are city-centre [area]s where urban decay is as plain as a [...]staff.

Nowhere is the life of Turks in Germany as clearly apparent as here, except perhaps in Kreuzberg, Berlin.

In Duisburg suburbs such as Marxloh and Meiderich, Bruckhausen, Hochfeld and Hüttenheim Turks have long made up over 40 per cent of the population.

In the under-18 age group there are more Turks than Germans, Many of the 52 patients Stephanie von Frankenberg interviewed came from this area.

With backing from a medical practitioner she had arranged with hospitals to be notified whenever a would-be suicide arrived so she could interview him in the ward as soon as possible.

"You have to interview them within three days," she says. "Then they are readay and willing to talk. After that they close up."

The problem is often a clash of generations in which teenage girls try to get their own way in opposition to their parents.

A typical case was that of an 18-year-old Turkish girl who had been in Germany for five years, was a factory worker and spoke fairly good German, certainly much better than her mother, for whom she had to translate.

At work she tried to keep abreast of German habits, chatting normally with German workmates, including the men. At home she lived in keeping with the strict family code.

Trouble started when her elder brother learnt that she had been chatting with a German male workmate. He waylaid the German outside the factory, had a fight with him and boxed his sister's ears in public.

She was so upset and ashamed that she took an overdose of sleeping pills. She well realised that her brother had done the right thing by Turkish standards.

She had overstepped the mark to a particularly serious extent because her parents had already arranged a marriage for her. She was to marry someone back in Turkey she had never seen.

The Italian girl who is No. 14 in Frau von Frankenberg's survey was 19 and had been in Germany since she was three.

She too spoke better German than Italian but her parents expected her to marry an Italian of their choosing. Unknown to her parents she had an affair with a German and hoped to get preganty by him to outsmart her parents.

One day he failed to turn up and she was afraid he might leave her and took an overdose of sleeping pills. She was unable to stand the discrepancy between the German view of life and the Italian Catholic morality of her family.

Yet she still felt somehow inferior because she was no longer a virgin and fancied she would no longer be able to find a husband.

"I would so like to be able to live like my classmates at school," said a 15-year-old Spanish girl who had just been rescued after a fifth suicide bid.

Pressure to conform at school was so strong she felt she just must wear jeans but her parents would hear nothing of the idea.

It is always much the same story and parents can be just as likely to attempt suicide as their children. A Sicilian mother of three aged 27 always seemed satisfied with her lot. Her problems did not start until her eldest son started school and she wanted to help him with his homework.

She suddenly came to realise how poorly equipped she was to cope with life in a country where she was unable to speak the language properly.

She sought refuge in suicide but the attempt was only temporarily going to outweigh her problems.

The division of the environment into two is usually the insuperable problem, the Bochum sociologist says. People try in vain to hold their own in two societies and lose their bearings.

Few would-be suicides complained of serious trouble with Germans that prompted their bid to end it all.

The suicide bid does not usually come early in their stay in Germany when acclimatisation is most difficult but after several years in the country.

The problems usually arise when the return home no longer looks like being some time soon, when the children no longer know their mother country, when the aim of earning money and returning home is no longer so clearly defined.

Frau von Frankenberg describes this state of affairs as the point at which a makeshift arrangement assumes permanent proportions.

It is a state in which minor problems can be enough to make the would-be suicide feel the situation defies solution.

Hanover sociologist Gerd Weiberg once interviewed guest workers in another connection and was told by a Yugoslav:

"You have never really left back home yet never really arrived here."

Gerd Kröncke

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 September 1981)

More jobs for foreign school-leavers

RHEINISCHE POST

Bonn Education Minister Björn Engholm (SPD) has urgently appealed to industry and the business community to pay more attention to vocational training facilities for young foreigners.

The integration of foreign residents was a problem that could only be solved on the spot in the fields, factories and workshops, he said. This presupposed the readiness of the business community to cooperate; Bonn could only run pilot projects to stimulate ideas.

Social Democrat Engholm told journalists in Bonn that training boosted the career prospects of foreign youngsters. It was also in industry's own interest, given that a shortage of skilled workers was likely to arise with falling birth rates.

Society could not, in any case, risk the social explosive that inevitably came into being when foreign youngsters ran an increasingly grave risk of joining the dole queue.

Herr Engholm, dealing with the initial results of a pilot project to train foreign youngsters with language difficulties and educational shortcomings, said three out of four foreign youngsters in Germany did not learn a trade.

The percentage among German youngsters of trades college age was a mere eight.

At present 37,000 foreign youngsters were undergoing vocational training or going to senior school, or 6,000 more than a year ago.

But over this period 40,000 more youngsters had settled in Germany, and if the trend continued it would be increasingly difficult to integrate them.

Turkish youngsters presented the worst integration problem, he said. Only nine per cent of them learnt a trade.

Integrating in German society was an enormous cultural leap for Turkish girls in particular, and cash alone would not solve the problem.

The spread of information as to why vocational training was so important was of fundamental importance. So was motivation.

The problem could not be solved in five or 10 years, Herr Engholm said. It would take generations.

His pilot scheme included 14 projects in six *Länder* to date. Bonn's aim was to prove that even youngsters with language difficulties and educational shortcomings could be satisfactorily trained and overcome some of their handicap during training.

Eighty companies training 420 young people were currently associated with the various schemes. Next year between 800 and 1,000 were to undergo training.

The jobs in which they were trained included mining, metalworking, woodworking, electrical engineering and retail salemanship.

Between now and 1985/86 Bonn was investing DM13.8m in the various projects. In some cases companies and the *Länder* were also underwriting the scheme, the range of which was to be extended next year.

Pilot projects were intended to show how far foreign youngsters and their parents could be best persuaded of the importance of career qualifications.

dpa

(Rheinische Post, 29 September 1981)

■ MODERN LIVING

Alternative employment scheme keeps jobless juveniles out of trouble

"Without JAS some of our boys would have landed in jail long ago," says Hartmut Radke about *Jugendarbeit und Sozialpädagogik* (youth work and social pedagogy) or JAS for short.

He has been working for the organisation as a mechanic since its establishment in Hamelin in 1975.

JAS, which aims to provide work for juveniles who are unemployed and cannot find apprenticeships, has come under the sponsorship of the Protestant Church.

Like some 40 similar organisations sponsored by the trade unions and churches in Lower Saxony, JAS wants to accustom jobless juveniles to regular working hours and a generally responsible way of life.

Since the JAS workshops are closed at the moment for the summer holidays there are now only three instead of 12 youngsters working under Radke's supervision. The workshop is in a decrepit former factory building.

Walter, Frank and Hermann, who work in the JAS carpentry shop, have volunteered, despite the holidays, to help out repairing some bicycles that are later to be used as JAS vehicles.

The mechanical workshop has specialised in repairing scrapped bikes and selling them.

Apart from its carpenter's shop and the mechanical workshop, JAS also runs a furniture removal business with its own small lorry.

Like on any other morning, the boys eat their breakfast with the supervisor. This is their opportunity to discuss not only their work but also their personal problems.

JAS teacher Hartmut Tegtmeier considers this important as a means of teaching the boys to show up for work on time. Moreover, he says, many of the boys have no permanent home and breakfast is the only sound meal they get.

Organisations like JAS have tackled a problem that has become increasingly more grave in the past few years: youth unemployment.

Latest statistics present a bleak picture. There were 130,800 unemployed youngsters under 20 registered in August – 60 per cent up on August last year.

The increase in juvenile unemployment within the span of one month, from July to August this year, was 13 per cent in this age group alone.

Lower Saxony's general unemployment rate is 6.9 per cent and thus exceeds the national average of 5.5 per cent.

Here, there were 21,100 juveniles out of work in August (7.8 per cent) against only 5.2 per cent in the same month last year.

The pay at the JAS workshops is low. Costs include premises, machinery and staff, consisting of a teacher, the master mechanic and the master carpenter.

Though the general operating costs are paid by the Protestant Church and a special fund of Lower Saxony's Education Ministry, the hourly wage rarely exceeds DM3 to DM4 once earnings have been divided up according to the number of hours worked.

Says one of the boys: "Sure, the pay is low. But to make up for it you don't have to put up with a boss who keeps breathing down your neck.

"Here, they tell you exactly how to do the job and they don't get sour if you just don't feel like working."

Yet discipline at JAS is strict. Work begins at 8.30 a.m., but the boys must be at their work benches by 8.15.

Latecomers are barred from work for that day. And those who have not put in the minimum 18 working hours a week have their pay halved even for the hours thy did put in.

But relations between the boys and their supervisors are almost those of buddies. As a result, Frank considers his instructor more of an older brother than a boss. "I can tell him about my problems," says Frank.

Frank, 19, has a background that is typical for the boys JAS and similar organisations look after.

Says he about himself: "I was always pretty good at practical work. It's only with theory that I have problems."

Frank is a dropout from both *Hauptschule* (the minimum compulsory schooling leading up to vocational training) and from vocational school.

It was a friend who took him to JAS when he was totally on his uppers. "I would never have come here on my own," says Frank.

Compared with Frank, Walter's educational background is pretty good. Put into an institution at the age of two, he completed school but broke off an apprenticeship as a carpenter after only three months.

He describes the reasons as follows: "No place to live, not enough money to keep going and trouble with the master."

After leaving his apprenticeship, he tramped around, experimented with drugs and took on occasional work. Eventually, a JAS supervisor found him and talked him into "dropping by sometime".

For the past four months, Walter has been working at JAS "to make a bit of money and because I couldn't find any other work."

He is as happy as a sandboy with the bit of money he makes because he enjoys the work. In fact, he does not even collect his unemployment pay because, as he puts it, "I know that with 1,000 marks in my pocket I wouldn't go back to work but would just hang around somewhere."

Radke considers psychological help as important as teaching a trade. And he can provide more psychological help than the boys could get in a normal job because the JAS supervisors simply have more time for their boys.

Walter agrees. He considers his vocational training important but secondary. As he sees it, what matters is the "new hope we get at JAS."

Asked about the success of JAS, W... ter says: "None of the boys who ... JAS have got into a worse mess th... they were in before. Many have fo... work and some have a regular appr... ticeship."

Walter estimates that about half ... boys who have left JAS now have a j... and 40 per cent are taking some form ... training.

He puts the number of those w... only hang around or wind up in jail ... return to JAS at about 10 per cent.

Like most private projects of ... nature in Lower Saxony, JAS is par... the State Work Group for Jobless Ju... niles. And like most of the other orga... sations it has had to struggle for fin... cial survival.

A spokesman for the Work Group ... cently stressed that dependence on st... funding and special programmes for ... less juveniles made it difficult to ach... any continuity in a project. Most of ... time, he said, is spent chasing a... money.

JAS is no exception. Origin... founded as a private organisation, ... eventually came under the wing of ... Protestant Church because it had ... other way of raising the necess... DM150,000 a year which it now ... from the state and the Church. The ... ganisation is now wholly Church-own...

One of the reasons that has ... prompted Hartmut Tegtmeier to ... notice is that, as he puts it, "Church ... tronage only made JAS financially be... administered but all new ideas were ... rificed in the process."

Norbert Korte

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 28 September 19...)

Apprentices and the boss

Neither the feeling of being underpaid nor the general atmosphere at work imposes the biggest strain on apprentices. It is the boss.

A just and decent boss promotes a positive attitude towards work; an unreasonable and unpleasant one who projects his own problems on to the youngsters (problems usually unconnected with work) creates conflicts that can lead to psychosomatic disorders.

Generally, the emotional stress apprentices experience at work is much greater than the stress caused by problems in private life, says sociologist Professor Henrik Kreutz of Erlangen-Nuremberg University in a study entitled *Arbeit – Emotion – Politik* (Work – Emotion – Politics).

Even so, he says, any black and white approach to the problem would be wrong because work can lead to an experience of success and a feeling of independence and creativity to a much greater extent than can be experienced during leisure time.

He also stresses that depression, disappointment and guilt feelings also occur outside working hours. He comes to the conclusion that apprentices' relationship to their work is extremely ambivalent.

The less fulfilment a young person derives from his work, the greater his job disappointment. This is further aggravated by the fact that many apprentices pin excessive and illusory expectations on their training when starting the apprenticeship.

This makes the contrast between work and leisure time even greater and leads to emotional overrating of the leisure time which expresses itself in excessive demands on friends that must eventually lead to deep disappointment.

Though a satisfactory job alone does not make for happiness, it does prevent excessive leisure time expactations.

Professor Kreutz also goes into the connection between the emotional state of apprentices and their political views. Only half the apprentices he surveyed consider the conventional parties (CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP) as being worthy of a vote.

The other half is pretty equally divided between followers of the environmentalists, those without a political opinion and those who do not consider themselves represented by any candidate standing for election.

Though three-quarters of the apprentices under review were proud of democracy, only one-third relate this feeling to politicians. Many are in fact ashamed of career politicians.

It also transpires that the followers of the environmentalist parties, unlike the majority of apprentices, do not feel that their work imposes a particular strain on them. On the contrary, most of their problems relate to leisure time activities.

It is this feeling of insecurity which is at the root of their sympathy for the environmentalists, for whom work is not everything.

What makes the environmentalists so attractive is their awareness of the negative consequences of modern technology in leisure time activities and the fact that work, production and economically rational actions are secondary in their concept.

Contrary to a widespread assumption, followers of the environmentalists rarely suffer from psychosomatic disorders such as headaches, dizziness, vomiting and stomach aches.

These symptoms are particularly pre... valent among those who do not go ... the polls and are not interested in po... tics.

This, Professor Kreutz says, seems ... indicate that negative emotions lead ... apathy and psychological or physic... problems only when the apprentices s... no way in which to improve the situ... tion.

The environmentalist movements (in... cluding the squatters) have become a... tractive to the young because they a... taking action to remedy shortcomings.

The attitudes of apprentices towar... foreigners are also not as generally ... sumed. The cliché has it that foreign... are rejected in direct proportion to ... apprentices' own struggle to hold on ... a job, when the foreigner is seen as ... competitor.

Though apprentices who tend to di... criminate against foreigners are mo... prone to psychosomatic disorders, xeno... phobia is most pronounced among thos... with an ambivalent relationship towa... their work.

The author has also compared appren... tices and university students in the sam... geographical region. He arrives at the ... startling conclusion that, by comparison ... the apprentices are emotionally ... balanced.

They are generally happier and fe... more successful than students. Yet psy... chosomatic disorders are more prevalent ... among apprentices.

According to Professor Kreutz, thi... could indicate that apprentices are mor... inclined to suppress their problems tha... are students.

Maybe so, but the comparison als... shows that the apprentices are less thin... skinned and self-pitying than universit... students.

Renate I. Mreschar

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 19 September 19...)

...LYMPIC CONGRESS

In search of the modern amateur

...s the IOC congress in Baden-... ...den worth the DM7m NOC ... Willi Daume raised in public ... funds to stage the Olympic ... marathon?

... million marks to hear 135 rep... ...s of the Olympic movement ... price to pay, especially when ...iced largely identical views.

... at least three levels Baden-... brought about much-needed ... in an unexpectedly sweeping ...

...dern definition of the amateur ... began to emerge. The war on ...emed set to be waged more en... ...y. Advocates of more democra... the Olympic movement gained ...at ground.

...was more than could be said of ...e to resist political pressure ...adfastly than in the past, often ...ciferously though the intention ...e been declared.

...d realistically, it cannot be re... ...s more than a well-meaning de... ... of intent.

...n threats to boycott the Los ... Olympics, seriously though they ...e taken, are not the acid test of ...termination.

...ficially at least, the Olympic ...ent left Baden-Baden stronger ...self-confident. Last year's boy... ...the Moscow Games evidently had ... effect.

...s were by no means surprised ...he Soviet Union and its allies in ...ative mood, even showing signs ...iness to compromise on the ...bject of amateur status.

...Russians have gradually extended ...influence on the International ... Committee to a point at which ...n rely on 25 per cent of the ... fundamental issues.

... 25 per cent were by no means ...n staunchly opposing open games ...ch pros would be entitled to take ...d thus maintaining the advantage ... by East Bloc amateurs.

...e the advantage enjoyed by state ...s over athletes from the free ... will be reduced a little in future; ...ertainly not by eliminated by the ...he IOC has at its disposal.

...sals to liberalise the amateur code so as to enable all athletes to compete who do not earn their living from sport can no longer be swept under the carpet.

The IOC members who invited athletes to attend the Baden-Baden congress and gave them a good round of applause can no longer reverse the trend. A majority of them would probably not want to do so.

So in future more Western athletes will be in a position to train as professionally as, say, Sebastian Coe without fear of being disqualified.

Coe is proof, if proof were needed, that a combination of individualism and talent and ambition can offset the East Bloc's scientific and methodical system of grooming stars.

Since circumstances vary so widely from one sport to another, the IOC cannot put an exact value on the latest approved version of the amateur.

This can only be done by the international sports associations, whose past breaches of the Olympic spirit have often unfairly been blamed on the IOC.

The International Olympic Committee lays claim to moral leadership of world sport, a leadership over and above that exercised by the various sports associations.

This claim should be acknowledged as long as there is no alternative that can be taken seriously.

Politicians invariably suggest that the Olympics could be supervised by Unesco, but under the UN body's aegis the number of Olympic idealists would surely be smaller.

Jupp Müller

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 1 October 1981)



A model of the sports complex in Seoul proposed for the Olympic summer events in 1988. (Photo: Werek)

Summer Games in Seoul 'good choice'

Was it the nearby Baden-Baden casino that decided the IOC to run the risk of staging the 1988 summer Olympics in Seoul?

Or did the committee decide to show the world that neither political nor commercial considerations could shake its resolve?

In Seoul and Calgary the IOC has chosen, as so often in the past, venues for the 1988 games that were not exactly rated favourites beforehand.

That makes the choice more noteworthy. The IOC is keen to hold the Olympics in as many countries as possible, so it could hardly have made a better choice than Seoul.

South Korea has never hosted an Olympics, whereas Japan, if Nagoya had made the running, would have hosted its third.

The East Bloc is naturally unhappy at the accolade to the Chung regime staging the 1988 Olympics represents, but Seoul took the wind out of critics' sails by announcing that competitors from North Korea would be officially invited.

Both the IOC and Seoul can look forward to protest moves, naturally so as long as a military regime remains in power in South Korea. The choice of Calgary for the winter Olympics was also a surprise after the difficulties encountered at Montreal and Lake Placid. But Calgary was an opportunity of demonstrating that the Olympic boycott had been forgotten, given that Canada had been one of the countries that boycotted Moscow. So in opting for Calgary the IOC showed it had finally put paid to the entire boycott affair.

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1 October 1981)



...of the Gladiators. (Cartoon: Fritz Wolf/from exhibition of German sports caricatures in Baden-Baden)

The athletes have their own say

Two dozen athletes and 10 trainers from all over the world at Baden-Baden were the first ever to represent Olympic competitors at an IOC congress.

They were quick to appreciate the strength enjoyed by even such a small group and proved remarkably active in the course of such a few days.

The athletes promptly drew attention to themselves by demanding from the International Olympic Committee more time to speak at the congress.

This bid was an immediate success. They were promptly allowed six five-minute periods, not four, as originally assigned.

This IOC concession led to an incident that heightened the determination of the group to brook no interference.

A Soviet NOC member gatecrashed one of their preparatory meetings to demand for a Soviet athlete one of the two extra five-minute allocations they had been given.

"That put the Soviet Union in a bad position," said fencer Thomas Bach, spokesman for the athletes on the German NOC.

It was up to the athletes themselves to decide who was to represent them on the rostrum, and they were determined no-one was going to exert pressure from outside their own group.

Bach, a Montreal gold medallist, was spokesman for a group set up to draft a viewpoint on the latest version of Rule 26 of the IOC Charter, dealing with amateur status.

"We prefer an arrangement involving both the international sports associations and the IOC," he said.

"First the associations should be allowed to arrive at a code in keeping with their requirements. Then the IOC should decide whether or not to give its seal of Olympic approval."

This, he added, presupposed that the IOC was prepared to accept a wide framework within which the special requirements of individual associations might be accommodated.

The revised version of Rule 26 provides for payments to athletes via their association only.

"There can be no objection to that," Bach said, "as long as the associations are prepared to make regular grants to athletes to enabled them to lead normal lives."

There could be no objection to spending part of the cash received on the association's general expenses, but the remainder should be paid to the individual athlete on retirement.

"Those who perform better put in more and deserve to earn more," Bach said.

There was no way in the world to stop illicit payments to athletes, bypassing the associations. But that was not such a serious problem.

Athletes agreed that fully-fledged professionals ought not to be allowed to compete in the Olympics, just as they were opposed to head-to-toe advertising.

Neither would prevail as long as athletes were offered a more tolerable alternative, he said.

But will Britain's Sebastian Coe, another at Baden-Baden, voluntarily see to it that his father breaks off relations with his American marketing manager?

Probably not.

Rainer Olbert

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 September 1981)